June 2026 FOMC: We Loved It!

We love it.

The outcome of the June FOMC meeting was marginally more hawkish than we had expected, although it remained broadly consistent with the projections of the FRB-US model.

We were particularly impressed by the new Chair. The communication was clear, direct, and effective. The new dot plot is finally realistic and corrects several of the mistakes made in March (see our highly critical post-March FOMC note here).

The new statement is also a welcome development. Its simplicity and clarity are refreshing, and any perception that the Fed was no longer fully committed to delivering its 2 percent inflation target has now been removed.

In short, we see little to criticize in today’s outcome. To us, the developments were overwhelmingly positive.

In the remainder of this note, we review the statement, the dot plot, the proposal to establish an inflation task force, and the key points from the Q&A session.

Statement

We LOVE it. A fantastic statement. At long last, someone has had the courage to move beyond the overly convoluted frameworks of PhD economists and speak in a clear, simple, direct manner, without resorting to Byzantine qualifications and unnecessary complexity. We love it!

The dots

The new SEP projections are now much more closely aligned with the model. This is particularly true for the federal funds rate, real GDP growth, and the unemployment rate. The largest remaining divergence concerns inflation. The June SEP incorporates a significant upward revision to the inflation outlook relative to March, moving materially closer to the model’s assessment (the March SEP was totally off for inflation..). Even so, FRB-US continues to project a more persistent inflation process and remains above the SEP at the end of the forecast horizon.

In the figure below, the blue solid lines represent the March SEP, the blue dots correspond to the June SEP, and the red lines show the latest FRB-US forecast. 

Figure 1. Dot plots vs FRB-US forecast

THE INFLATION “TASK FORCE”

As for the new inflation task force, we are not surprised that the new Chair has decided to proceed in this direction. Ultimately, it is part of a broader question about whether the Fed’s existing framework still makes sense in the post-Covid environment. That said, we do not expect this review to produce particularly dramatic results.

It is worth noting—Riccardo speaking here—that a task force arguably larger than anything the Fed is likely to assemble has already been conducted within the profession recently. The effort involved more than 70 economists, academics, and policymakers and culminated in the Research Handbook of Inflation, of which Riccardo served as editor and also authored the chapter on inflation measurement.

The use of alternative datasets can certainly be beneficial. However, the results obtained so far have not been revolutionary. Alternative data can improve measurement at the margin and provide more timely information, but only for some items, particularly on the goods side. For services, the fundamental challenges of measurement and quality adjustment are likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future.

As for the broader framework, the idea of completely abandoning a NK Phillips Curve approach is probably a step too far. Doing so would essentially require abandoning the notion that marginal costs are linked to price dynamics, which is a very strong proposition regardless of one’s theoretical preferences. At the same time, there is certainly room to revisit older frameworks when assessing risks. Monetary aggregates are one example. The Research Handbook of Inflation includes an entire chapter on this topic, written by Gianni Amisano of the Federal Reserve Board. Another example is the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, which is also covered in a dedicated chapter of the Handbook.

More generally, we believe the timeline suggested by Warsh—roughly six months to obtain meaningful results—is probably too ambitious. If the objective is to undertake serious research on measurement issues, alternative datasets, and a comprehensive reassessment of the literature, then a more realistic horizon is one to two years. Otherwise, in the near term, the practical outcome is likely to be that things continue largely as before.

In any event, we do not expect groundbreaking conclusions to emerge from this exercise. The most likely outcome is a series of incremental improvements, particularly in the quality and timeliness of the data, rather than a fundamental rethinking of how inflation is understood or how monetary policy is conducted.

Link to the book here.

Q&As

Question: Inflation is not projected to going back to 2% until 2028. Can you hold on for so long and what would it take to raise rates?

Warsh. “First, we have the capability and commitment to deliver on our price stability objective of 2 percent. That is exactly what we are going to do. At the end of the Fed’s review of its strategy over the last number of years, in January, the Fed, including the strategy that we are still bound by, the Fed statement says that inflation is primarily determined by monetary policy. You bet it is. I have said for years inflation is a choice. You bet it is. Today I am announcing that this committee unambiguously and unanimously has decided we are going to deliver on that. The rest of your questions sounded like an encouragement for me to give forward guidance. We have dropped forward guidance. Some on the committee, I think, dropped it, I suspect from our discussion over the last couple of days, because they said that at this moment in time it does not feel as though providing forward guidance is right. Others have, I would say, different views and think, as a general proposition, forward guidance is not the business we should be in. That will be taken up by the task force on communications and my policymaker colleagues. We are going to listen hard to what the experts say and make our own decision. But I cannot give any forward guidance about what we are going to do next. The good news is that we will be meeting in six weeks.”

Comment: Finally, is there some hope that the FOMC will start taking the 2% inflation target seriously? Perhaps. Time will tell.

Question: Are rates restrictive?

Warsh. “I have heard characterizations both inside and outside about that. I will give you my own. It is uneven. If I look at the housing market as one example, Fed policy is not the single determinant of the state of the housing market. Broadly, I would say there, Fed policy appears to be somewhat restrictive. I would have a hard time managing to say those words if I were to look at what is happening in financial markets. So, I would say it is uneven. That is perhaps a function of different transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, whether monetary policy is coming from our interest rate tool or from a balance sheet tool. The good news is that we have a task force on that too, and the balance sheet task force will be looking more at that subject.”

Comment: Several clients—indeed, several of you reading this note—have expressed the view that the neutral real interest rate, r⁎, is closer to 1.5%, materially above the FOMC’s current estimate. We broadly agree with that assessment. While estimating r⁎ in real time is notoriously difficult, the combination of persistent fiscal deficits, elevated investment demand, stronger productivity growth, and resilient economic activity all point toward a higher equilibrium real rate than was typical in the pre-pandemic period.

Question: How do you see inflation in the long run? What are the underlying inflation pressures in the economy?

Warsh. “So, I cannot do much better than the Committee just did, so let me restate it. Inflation remains elevated relative to the Committee’s 2 percent goal, in part reflecting supply shocks that have driven price increases in certain sectors, including energy. That paragraph goes on to say, but to be clear, the Fed will deliver price stability.
My own judgment is that the Committee spent quite a bit of time, not just over two days, but through multiple iterations over a couple of weeks. That is what we are prepared to say about inflation. But the commitment to deliver is strong, unanimous, and unambiguous. That is, I think, an important message. We have missed for five years, and we are going to fix that.
”

Comment: This is a constructive answer, in our view. It reinforces the notion that the Federal Reserve remains committed to its mandate and continues to take inflation risks seriously. At the same time, it pushes back against Powell’s narrative that the current inflation pressures can be explained solely by transitory shocks. Instead, it acknowledges the possibility that more persistent forces may be at work and that policymakers should remain attentive to that risk.

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