A bad day for Powell, the FOMC, and the Fed staff. We are big fans of Powell here, but we think he had a bad day—likely driven by a weak Fed staff forecast and a divided Committee.
SEP is puzzling, confused Q&A session.. The new SEP is almost identical to the FRB-US forecasts for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate. However, the inflation forecast in the SEP makes little sense and gives the impression of being based on outdated data. Even taking into account how the staff constructs its forecasts (see below for technical explanations), oil prices have risen by $40–50 per barrel since the December meeting. As such, the headline PCE forecast should have been revised much more significantly upward. Even the core PCE forecast appears too low given the incoming data. Admittedly, the war introduces uncertainty, but forecasts are based on futures prices, which imply materially higher inflation readings. Moreover, some of Powell’s responses sounded genuinely confusing to us. It was particularly unfortunate that the Chair appeared to dismiss the SEP altogether (two or three times during the Q&A), as it actually contained several important insights (higher Y*, higher R*—eureka!).
In the end, we are left quite puzzled. It seems that by providing an inflation forecast that is too low, the staff has placed itself, the FOMC, and Powell in a “hold and hope” position—a very problematic stance—dangerous and technically unsound (see our comments in the Q&A)—for a central bank to adopt.
Statement
Uncertainty. To us, the message of the new statement is the following: “uncertainty is too high now to make up our minds”.
The dots
Puzzling!
The new Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) is, in our view, quite puzzling.
Let us start with what does not add up. On the one hand, staff procedures typically imply only a gradual reaction to incoming data, with revisions to the current-year forecast occurring progressively as new data are released. For this reason, we did not expect the SEP to fully reflect the signals coming from the models for inflation. That said, the recent shock and the persistence of core inflation—even prior to the Iran conflict—would suggest a meaningfully higher inflation forecast, particularly given that the SEP embeds a strong economy in 2026 and 2027. Put differently, this SEP appears as if it were based on outdated information for inflation—already stale and, to some extent, not particularly informative. We are genuinely surprised. Does the staff really estimate that a 40-50$ oil shock implies 3 tenths higher inflation? Honestly, it makes no sense.
By contrast, there are elements that are not surprising:
(i) the Fed acknowledges that potential growth is higher (the FRB-US model has been pointing to this for nearly two years);
(ii) the estimate of r* is higher (a view we have held for the past four years); and
(iii) no FOMC member has signaled the possibility of a rate hike (for the record, as we have discussed with some of you, the bar for a hike is extremely high—much higher than what is currently perceived in the market).
(iv) real GDP growth and the path of the unemployment rate, as they are almost identical to FRB-US (the only difference is higher growth in 2026, likely due to an upward judmental correction driven by the 2025 government shutdown).
Figure 1. Comparison between the December SEP (blue line), pre-FOMC FRB-US model run (red line), and the March SEP (blue dots).
Q&As
Question: Should you look through the oil shock?
Powell. “The thing that’s really important that we see this year is progress on inflation through a reduction in goods inflation as the one-time effects on prices of tariffs go through the system, go through the economy. That’s the main thing we’re looking for going into this exercise. And we need to be seeing that to, you know, to sort of understand that we actually are making progress, because on net, we didn’t make progress.
And if you look at total inflation—sorry, total core inflation—it’s about 3%, and some big chunk of that, between a half and three quarters, is actually tariffs. So we’re looking for progress on that.
The question of whether we look through the energy inflation doesn’t really arise until we have kind of checked that box. It, of course, is kind of standard learning that you look through energy shocks, but that’s always been dependent on inflation expectations remaining well-anchored.
And I think now it’s also dependent on what you mentioned, which is that broader context of five years now of inflation above target. We have to keep all of those things in mind, and the question of looking through, when it does arise, will be one to approach not lightly, but, you know, in the context that you mentioned.”
Comment: Very puzzling answer by Powell. The main issue for the Fed is not goods inflation but core services ex-housing. In general, the simple fact that inflation has remained above target for so long is an issue.
Question: Does looking through the oil shock undermine the Fed’s credibility to return to 2%?
Powell. “that’s on everyone’s mind, you know, we’re well aware of the history, and, but you don’t want to overreact to that, you know, you want to make the best judgment you can based on the facts.
We’re not, I don’t think we’re going to let it color our decision-making more than is appropriate. It’s more the thought that it’s been five years, and we’ve actually had, you know, we had the tariff shock, we had the pandemic, and now we have an energy shock of some size and duration. We don’t know what that’s going to be, actually.
And, you know, it’s one of those things where it’s a repeated set of things, and you worry that that’s the kind of thing that can, you know, can cause trouble for inflation expectations. And so we worry a lot about that, and we’re, you know, we are very strongly committed to doing what it takes to keep inflation expectations anchored at 2%.
And, you know, I think it’s important that we, that we do that—very important.”
Comment: Again, a confused answer. It seems the FOMC is not worried (yet) as they think expectaions are anchored. The problem is always the same: when expectations start moving.. it is too late!
Question: Why is non-housing services inflation so sticky considering the labor market?
Powell. “Good question. It’s frustrating. Non-housing services have basically moved sideways for a year. They’re at the same level. And we do expect that they will come down. But, you know, it’s a bunch of idiosyncratic things.
But at the same time, that is one of the things we should be seeing because, to your point, you know, the labor market is clearly not a source of inflationary pressures, and that should really matter for non-housing services. But we’re not seeing progress there.
So we do, you know, what we expect for next year is continued—what we want to see for this year, rather—is continued progress on housing services, finally seeing the, you know, the goods inflation come back down because the one-time effects of tariffs are through, and then also get some help from non-housing services.
That’s what we’d like to see. But it’s, you know, it’s a good question why we didn’t see much of that last year.”
Comment: The summary: “We have no idea”. And that’s the point here: the Fed staff (and now the FOMC) are in the “wait and hope” position, which happens to be a very uncomfortable one for a central bank.
Question: Oil is not the only shock right now. We are having other commodities shocks, as well as supply chains under stress. How concerned are you for inflation?
Powell. “You know, you can worry about other commodities, you can worry about all of the ways that oil-related commodities go into manufacturing and that kind of thing. The truth is it’s completely out of our hands and we just, like everybody else, we have to just wait and see what happens.
And it’ll come down to how long, you know, the current situation lasts, and then what are the effects on prices, and then how do consumers react and that kind of thing.
Really, I wouldn’t speculate in any way, and there’s really not a lot we can do other than kind of watch and see.”
Comment: This is another puzzling answer. If the Fed really thinks that supply shocks are dominating and uncertainty is high, then monetary policy should be more reactive (not less). The reader can reference to this new paper by Tommaso Monacelli: link. (the intutiion being that in the current world, core inflation is likely more persistent).
Question: Did you discuss the impact of oil prices on inflation expectations?
Powell. “At this meeting, I mean, a number of people mentioned and staff briefed on short-term expectations having moved up quite a lot for reasons we understand well.
But long-term expectations, you know, you can always find one that’s troubling or some aspect of one that’s troubling, but ultimately, right through this whole period, the overwhelming majority of the things we look to—including markets, including surveys of, you know, of the public and also of forecasters—they’ve all been pretty solid on longer-term inflation expectations being right where they need to be, consistent with 2%.
So that continues to be the case. We didn’t have a lot of conversation about that. I think everyone does agree that, you know, we’ll be watching those extremely carefully as we see the effects of the price increases come through from the conflict.”
Comment: Long-standing debate: are inflation expectations anchored? If the reader is interested in a contrarian view, see Ricardo Reis here. The bottom line to us is that in the current environment a central bank should not take anything for granted.