FRB and the Fiscal Mess – An Update

New year, same old issues. This note provides an updated analysis of fiscal simulations using the FRB-US model. Compared to our previous updates (see the November 2023 and June 2024 notes here and here, and here), the fiscal outlook has not improved; in fact, it has marginally worsened. Despite the severity of the situation, it remains unclear how many politicians, economists, and market participants fully understand its gravity.

Summary of results

  1. No matter what fiscal consolidation plan we assume, the debt/GDP ratio increases at least until 2026-2027. The same is true for net interest payments.
  2. Cutting public spending (“G”) has limited effects in stabilizing the debt/GDP ratio.
  3. Targeting the stabilization of the deficit/GDP requires a significant increase in the average tax rate on personal income, possibly too large to be feasible. In any case, stabilizing the deficit/GDP is not enough to stabilize the debt/GDP.
  4. Targeting the stabilization of the debt/GDP implies sizable spending cuts and much higher (personal income) tax rates. Even in this scenario, the only way to achieve a stable debt/GDP dynamic is a decade-long fiscal consolidation plan with the idea of reaching the desired target by 2034. Shorter horizons imply unfeasible or counterproductive paths.
  5. Assuming a high growth scenario (3.0% real GDP YoY) and no fiscal consolidation does not have positive effects on the debt/GDP ratio, as the fiscal issue is too large to be offset by higher growth.

Below we present a set of fiscal consolidation scenarios. As usual, the dashed red line shows the baseline, while the solid gray line shows the constructed scenario. In each figure there are two panels, the left one shows the deficit/GDP ratio, while the right one shows the debt (held by the public)/GDP ratio. We take Q4 (updated) as in-sample; all simulations start in Q1. More detailed results, including the path of variables not shown (i.e. unemployment rate, 10y government yield, etc..) are available for each scenario upon request.

Results of the FRB-US simulations

Scenario #1. Federal spending cut

Assumptions: federal government investment is lower by 1 pct of GDP and labor expenditures are lower by half a percent of GDP.

Result: cutting “G” lowers real GDP growth for 1 year, increases the unemployment rate (which reaches almost 6%), and results in a more dovish FF rate. It also reduces marginally the deficit/GDP ratio, but it does little on the debt/GDP dynamics which remains explosive (the reason why the debt/GDP decreases at the end of the forecast is because the model converges by increasing taxes in 2028, otherwise the dynamics are explosive). The intuition behind this result is simple: the issue is bigger than 1.5% of GDP.

(Note if the reader is unfamiliar with FRB-US and the current baseline. The model forecast is more pessimistic than CBO for two reasons: (i) taxes do not increase going forward in FRB-US, and (ii) the path of the interest rates is higher in FRB-US than in CBO).

Scenario #2. Forward-looking expectations

Assumptions: same as in scenario #1 but in this case, we run the model using “model consistent expectations”, that is extending the forecast horizon with only forward-looking expectations for all agents.

Result: the result is not materially different compared to scenario #1. The deficit/GDP ratio increases until 2027, and the debt/GDP ratio remains explosive until then. After 2027, the debt/GDP ratio decreases but again this is achieved by FRB increasing significantly the personal average tax rate. In other words: yes, it is possible to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio but only assuming that taxes will go up in the future.

Scenario #3. Deficit targeting scenario

Assumptions: we asked the model to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio by 2027 achieved without lowering “G”.

Result: as requested, the deficit/GDP ratio stabilizes at around 7% by 2027. However, according to FRB-US, this implies raising the average tax rate on personal income by about 4pp (from around 14% to around 18%). Nevertheless, despite the significant tax increases, the debt/GDP continues to grow, as the deficit is too large. Only in 2028 the debt/GDP ratio decreases but again this happens because the model raises taxes even further.

Scenario #4. Permanently higher real GDP growth

Assumptions: real GDP grows at 3.0% permanently going forward. We achieve this in the model distributing add factors to each component of GDP.

Results: higher GDP results in a more favorable debt/GDP dynamic. However, the path of the debt/GDP ratio remains explosive as the higher real GDP growth is in any case more than offset by the large deficit. The debt/GDP ratio falls at the end of the forecast period but again, only when the model increases taxes.

Scenario #5. Negative term-premium shock

Assumptions: same spending cuts as in scenario #1 but associated with a negative term premium shock of 50bps across the yield curve.

Result: not enough to make a material difference, as the deficit is still too large.

Conclusion

The 2025 fiscal year has started with a very large deficit (see here). The result of the simulations is clear: it is not going to be easy to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio. The only feasible way to do it is to extend the horizon (to at least 10 years) and implement a combination of tax increases, spending cuts, and pro-growth reforms. Raising more revenues via tariffs helps but does not solve the issue. We remain unsure if, how and when a credible fiscal consolidation plan will be implemented.

Contact

Want something more tailored?

We provide tailored consulting on ad-hoc projects.