US: FRB-US and the Fiscal.. Mess! – Part II

If the reader has questions, please direct them to our FRB-US specialist: Tilda Horvath (tilda.horvath@underlyinginflation.com). Tilda has programmed FRB-US at the Board and managed the model for almost 20 years. We remind the reader that we run ad-hoc scenarios using FRB-US free of charge. Do not be shy.

Scenario #2: a one-time fiscal shock

A temporary reduction of federal purchases equal to 1 percent of GDP does not solve the issue. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the federal fiscal balance assuming a temporary contraction of federal purchases equal to 1 percent of GDP (the green line). As usual, the scenario is compared to the current “inconsistent FRB-US” baseline (the red line). The main takeaway of this scenario is that a temporary measure has no effect on the big picture because the deficit and yields remain too high and the debt/GDP ratio does not stabilize.

(The reader can see the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the output gap and core inflation to a set of shocks here. The IRF to federal purchases is the second line of charts in the document.)

Figure 1. Federal government fiscal balance to GDP ratio. (red-model baseline; green-scenario #2)

A temporary fiscal shock has, nevertheless, sizable implications for growth and the FF rate. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FF rate and real GDP growth under the temporary fiscal shock scenario (green line) and the current baseline (the red line). While a temporary fiscal measure does not have visible implications for the deficit (and the deficit/GDP ratio), it nevertheless lowers real GDP growth by about 7-8 tenths within the first 6 quarters, increases the unemployment rate (not shown), it has negligible effects on core inflation (not shown), and lowers the path of the FF rate. The path of the 5y, 10y, and 30y yield implied by this scenario can be seen here. The conclusion of scenario #2 is that given the size of the deficit and level of yields, implementing a temporary fiscal measure is probably not a good idea because it would end up lowering growth while leaving the fiscal sustainability issue on the table.

Figure 2. Evolution of main variables. (red-model baseline; green-scenario #2)

Scenario #3. Combination of permanent fiscal shocks

A combination of permanent fiscal shocks does stabilize the deficit/GDP ratio. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the federal fiscal balance assuming a permanent contraction of federal purchases equal to 0.5 percent of GDP and a gradual increase (2% cumulative in 4 years) of the average tax rate on personal income (the green line). The size of these shocks is arbitrary but small enough to be credible and implementable by a committed fiscal authority. Once again, in Figure 3 the red line indicates the current model baseline. The main takeaway is that a relatively small fiscal adjustment does stabilize the deficit/GDP ratio (despite the slowdown in growth, discussed in the next paragraph), although the debt/GDP remains unstable (figure here) because the deficit/GDP is too high.

Figure 3. Federal government fiscal balance to GDP ratio. (red-model baseline; green-scenario #3)

A credible fiscal consolidation plan is effective but comes with a cost. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the main variables of interest under scenario #3 (red lines) and the baseline (red lines). The takeaway of this scenario is that the fiscal consolidation comes with an output cost. Under scenario #3, real GDP growth is (small) negative in 2024 before recovering slowly. In this scenario, the unemployment rate (not shown) reaches 6 percent by the end of 2026, the Fed successfully disinflates, and the FF rate returns to the lower bound. The evolution of the yields implied by this scenario can be seen here.

Figure 4. Evolution of main variables. (red-model baseline; green-scenario #3)

(One caveat to our analysis and this scenario in particular is that the announcement of credible (fiscal) policy can trigger a market reaction on yields beyond the projected levels by the model, which are endogenously determined. Because the level of yields is crucial for the evolution of the debt going forward, the results in this scenario are probably an upper bound. In other words, in this scenario the debt/GDP ratio can, in fact, stabilize if yields drop notably).

Scenario #4. A negative aggregate demand / recessionary shock

A recession would make everything worse. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the FF rate and real GDP growth under a scenario (the green line) in which we have simulated an exogenous 100bps shock to the equity premium (roughly equivalent to 20% drop of the stock market) and a 0.8% temporary negative demand shock to each component of the aggregate demand (“C”, “G”, and “I”). This scenario is meant to simulate the possible slowdown of the US economy that some expect/fear for next year. In this scenario, real GDP growth is slightly negative at the end of 2024, the unemployment rate (not shown) goes well above 5%, and the Fed cuts the FF rate throughout the forecast horizon. The evolution of the yields implied by this scenario is here. A corollary of the projected drop of output without fiscal consolidation is that the evolution of the debt/GDP ratio in this scenario (Figure 6) is even more unfavorable than in scenario #3. Intuitively, as we just wrote, this happens because while the effects on the denominator are similar, in scenario #3 the numerator (the deficit) is much smaller precisely because of the fiscal consolidation plan (for the record: the difference of the debt/GDP ratio at the end of 2026 between scenario #3 and scenario #4 is about 10pp (!)).

Figure 5. Evolution of main variables. (red-model baseline; green-scenario #4)

Figure 6. Federal government debt (held by the public) to GDP ratio. (red-model baseline; green-scenario #4)

Conclusion

Hard to find a single good news or a path that stabilizes the debt/GDP ratio. The latest CBO projections (here – reported in Figure 7 below for convenience) show that the debt/GDP ratio of the US is on an unsustainable trajectory. In the CBO simulations, the debt/GDP ratio raises mainly because of increasing interest costs (and higher health care and social security spending). Crucially, in the CBO projections, the 10y yield remains around 4% in 2023 and going forward. When the fiscal position of the US is assessed using a general equilibrium model (FRB-US), the conclusion is even more worrying: the debt/GDP ratio is explosive under several scenarios because the size of the deficit is large (and expected to remain so) and because yields have run higher than what CBO was projecting. The model also suggests that at this point it is very difficult to find the right balance between reducing the deficit without lowering growth substantially (which of course would be counterproductive, as shown). In the end, we remain unsure about what can stabilize the debt/GDP ratio going forward and we agree with Olivier Blanchard (here, here, and even more here: “I worry that the US, which has a more substantial challenge [than the EA, ndr], with large primary deficits, a higher (r-g) than most others, and a dysfunctional budget process, may not be prepared to do what is needed.”). Considering the size of the primary fiscal deficit (about 3% of GDP in 2023), if we have shifted to a r>g world, then the size of the fiscal adjustment required to achieve a sufficient primary surplus that stabilizes the debt dynamics is non-negligible. Very hard to think the US political system will be willing to do what it takes any time soon. The most likely scenario is that the debt/GDP will continue to grow for at least another decade. Hard to think this is a story of success for “big fiscal”, as some keep arguing.

Figure 7. Latest CBO projections.

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