The first time we addressed the fiscal situation of the United States was two years ago (one of our notes is here). In this note, we provide an update through a series of simulations. What we show is that the fiscal situation has clearly not improved over these years; if anything, the debt trajectory has become even more difficult to stabilize than it was two years ago. The broad conclusion is that, in the near term, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio is essentially impossible. Achieving stabilization would require a much longer time horizon, but even in that case some paths now appear undesirable, either economically or politically.
TL; DR: A meaningful fiscal adjustment is clearly necessary, likely involving both the spending side and the tax side. However, our simulations also show that a moderate fiscal adjustment combined with a productivity shock and a more accommodative Fed toward inflation—in other words, a Fed willing to tolerate a higher inflation target—could also be sufficient to stabilize public debt dynamics. Naturally, this would imply accepting a structurally higher inflation target, likely around or even above 3 percent.
The baseline and the simulated scenarios
We present a set of five alternative scenarios alongside the baseline projection. As usual, the baseline is represented by the red lines, while the scenarios are shown in gray. As a reminder, under the current FRB-US baseline, the debt-to-GDP ratio follows an explosive path over the Tealbook forecast horizon. Beyond that horizon, the model stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio by imposing a significant increase in the average personal income tax rate. This adjustment is necessary within the model framework, as the debt dynamics would otherwise remain unsustainable.
All simulations are conducted under model-consistent expectations, rather than VAR-consistent expectations. This technical modification is required to extend the forecast horizon, given that, as noted above, there is effectively no feasible way to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio by 2028 under the standard setup. For each scenario, we report four panels: the government fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio, the net debt-to-GDP ratio, the average personal income tax rate, and government net interest payments as a share of GDP.
Scenario #1 – Federal Spending cut
In this scenario, we attempt to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio through a discretionary reduction in federal government spending (“G”) equal to 1% of GDP. Unsurprisingly, both the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio and the debt-to-GDP trajectory improve modestly. Overall, however, the difference relative to the baseline remains limited, and the bulk of the adjustment continues to come from higher taxation. Intuition: the deficit/GDP is too large to be reduced meaningfully by a 1% cut.
Scenario #2 – deficit/GDP target
In this scenario, we target a fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3% by the end of the simulation horizon. The model achieves this outcome through a substantial increase in the average personal income tax rate. The adjustment is implemented gradually over time, such that economic growth (not shown) slows relative to the baseline but remains positive throughout the simulation.
As expected, the debt-to-GDP ratio ends up significantly lower than in the baseline scenario, given the primary fiscal surpluses. The main takeaway is straightforward: reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio requires a meaningful fiscal adjustment, which is likely to involve a non-trivial increase in taxation at this point.
Scenario #3 – Financial repression
What if the Fed were to accept a permanently higher inflation rate? Would that help, and by how much? In the third scenario, we assume that the Federal Reserve adopts a higher inflation target of 3%. Technically, we implement this by raising the inflation target in the model’s Taylor rule.
Financial repression, in the form of higher inflation, mechanically helps reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by the end of the simulation horizon. However, the improvement relative to the baseline is not particularly large. The intuition is straightforward: the fiscal deficit is large, and some form of fiscal adjustment is required regardless. Of course, raising the inflation target above 3% would provide additional support in lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, we do not view such a scenario as realistic.
Scenario #4 – Higher productivity
The U.S. economy—and possibly the global economy—is currently experiencing a positive productivity shock. In this scenario, we assume that the shock raises potential GDP growth to 3%, implying that real GDP growth averages approximately 3% over the forecast horizon.
Unsurprisingly, the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the simulation is lower than in the baseline scenario. However, once again, the improvement is not particularly large. The intuition is the same as before: without a meaningful fiscal adjustment, the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio remains excessively high.
Scenario #5 – A combination of factors
What if the economy were to benefit from a combination of favorable factors—such as stronger productivity growth, a more dovish Federal Reserve, and some degree of fiscal consolidation? In this scenario, we combine three elements: a positive productivity shock (raising real GDP growth to around 3%), a dovish Fed (allowing PCE inflation to remain well above 2% over the medium term), and a gradual fiscal consolidation (implemented through a gentle increase in the average tax rate).
The interaction of these factors produces a debt-to-GDP ratio of roughly 90% by the end of the forecast horizon, making this the most favorable scenario among those we simulate. The main takeaway is straightforward: reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio requires (gradual) policy adjustments along multiple dimensions.
Conclusion
The fiscal situation is a mess, and it has only deteriorated in recent years. We remain uncertain as to how many market participants and policymakers fully appreciate what would actually be required to place the debt-to-GDP ratio on a sustainable downward trajectory.