US: Pre-September 2025 FOMC Meeting Package

We will update this pre-FOMC meeting package after the CPI, but only in case of a major surprise.

The New SEP: Harder than Usual

Over the past three years, the FRB-US model has provided a reliable guide for anticipating the dot plot. This time, however, caution is warranted, as the Fed’s reaction function is likely shifting. Below we outline what the model implies and what we expect the SEP to show.

Real GDP growth remains largely unchanged in the model, and we expect the SEP to reflect a similar stability across the forecast horizon.

Core PCE inflation runs modestly higher in the model in every year. In principle, this would justify an upward revision of about two-tenths in 2025, but we would not take such an adjustment for granted; the SEP may instead register only marginal changes, or none at all.

The unemployment rate projections represent the key uncertainty. While FRB-US and some incoming data point to a possible downward revision in the dots, we view such an outcome as unlikely. If anything, we expect the FOMC to move in the opposite direction, revising the unemployment forecast slightly higher—by perhaps one-tenth—in 2025.

As for the federal funds rate, the logic discussed above applies. It is difficult to justify a sequence of cuts within an inertial Taylor rule framework. Even under a non-inertial rule, the funds rate remains above neutral in the model over the forecast horizon. For this reason, we believe the most plausible outcome in the SEP is the inclusion of one additional cut in 2025, bringing the total to three. Beyond that, however, the path is expected to remain at or above neutral through the medium term. The greatest divergence between market pricing and the SEP, in our view, is likely to emerge in 2026.

Main points:

  • Recent data have been in line with the Fed staff’s forecast implied by the latest FOMC minutes. There has been no improvement in the distribution of price changes, which continues to be inconsistent with the inflation target. The common component across items suggest that tariffs-related effects have started to materialize in the data. We expect them to continue in the near-term.

Figure 1. Core CPI MoM prices change distributions.

  • The medium-term forecast is little changed; pi* remains higher than target. Compared to the previous projection, the medium-term model-based forecast is little changed, as the incoming data confirmed the model’s own forecast. Our estimate for pi* remains around 2½%, higher than what the Fed staff is estimating.

Figure 2. Current and previous FOMC round “main” model forecast of core PCE price inflation.

  • The estimate of “underlying inflation” (pi*) remains higher than target. According to our models, pi* is at 2.6 percent. Pi* is very persistent by nature and remains above the Fed target and above what the Fed staff is estimating (at 2% (see Peneva et al (2025)).

Figure 3. Evolution of the estimate of pi*.

  • Path of the Federal Funds (FF) rates. Inertial Taylor rules suggest that the FF rate should be above the June SEP. The only way to rationalize recent FOMC communication is to use a non-inertial Taylor rule, although even in this case the FF rate remains above neutral going forward. In our estimate, the most likely scenario for the SEP is to show one additional cut in 2025 (3 in total) but remain at or above neutral throughout the medium-term.

Figure 4. FRB-US model forecast

Note: red lines = model forecast, blue lines = June SEP, red-dashed = model forecast assuming non-inertial Taylor rule.

As usual, we would be more than happy to schedule a meeting to discuss the details.

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