Preamble. Today’s PCE data were in line with our expectation (we were below consensus but our translation proved to be one of the most accurate). The published YoY is exactly in line with our expectations (2bps miss for core, 1bps miss for headline). Our current translation for February is 45bps for core (YoY at 3.06%) and 44bps for headline PCE (YoY at 2.87%). Details are here.
The BEA has released a new Table2.4.4 with new information about the translation. We will update our Excel-based translation next week and circulate a revised version. Stay tuned! Note that our current Feb translation does NOT incorporate any methodological changes yet.
At this time, we generally circulate our Pre-FOMC meeting package. This time, we prefer circulating an updated FRB-US baseline and a set of scenarios that we suspect might be discussed at the upcoming FOMC. Pre-FOMC meeting package to follow.
TL;DR version: In the updated baseline, the model implies NO rate cut in 2026 (incoming data took away the only cut the model had) and less than 2 cuts in 2027. Inflation remains too high and persistent for the Federal Reserve to ease policy in the first half of the year (at minimum). At the same time, economic growth remains solid and the unemployment rate gradually declines. The scenario analysis suggests that a temporary oil price shock is largely irrelevant for monetary policy, regardless of its size. However, if the shock proves persistent—lasting one to two quarters—and is accompanied by an appreciation of the dollar, the overall effect becomes mildly dovish, as growth weakens and core inflation moderates. Importantly, none of the scenarios generates a federal funds rate hike. Overall, the model points to a “wait-and-see” policy stance. The new SEP can take out 1 cut in 2026 and 1 in 2027.
The New Baseline
Assumptions. The new baseline incorporates revised assumptions for Q4 real GDP growth following today’s BEA report, as well as updated oil prices (average in Q1: 77US$ per barrel) and core PCE prices.
NO cut in 2026, 2 cuts (almost) in 2027. The overall message of the updated baseline is broadly consistent with the signals the model has been sending over the past few weeks and months: inflation remains persistent, growth continues to be positive, and the labor market remains solid. The main new development is that, in response to the latest incoming data—primarily the CPI release—the model has removed one rate cut from the 2026 profile and now implies no cuts this year (and 35-40bps of cuts in 2027). At the same time, the ongoing war is adding an additional layer of uncertainty to the outlook, which further supports a cautious policy stance.
Figure 1. FRB-US: Baseline (red lines) and December SEP (blue lines)
Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis. Core inflation refers to core PCE price inflation.
Scenarios “Higher oil prices – NO persistency”
Assumptions. In these scenarios, we simulate a one-time, non-persistent shock to oil prices. Specifically, we consider two cases: a $25 increase and a $50 increase in oil prices.
Results. In the model, a one-time, non-persistent oil price shock does not generate meaningful effects on economic growth, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds rate. Naturally, the shock does affect headline inflation; however, as long as the impact on core inflation remains minimal, it does not imply any change in the monetary policy stance.
Figure 2. FRB-US: Baseline (red lines) and constructed scenarios (green and grey lines).
Note: Real GDP growth is expressed on a year-over-year basis.
Scenarios “Higher AND persistent oil prices with a dollar shock”
Assumptions. In these scenarios, we assume higher and more persistent oil shocks. Specifically, we construct three scenarios: the green lines, the gray lines, and the purple lines. Each scenario differs from the others in terms of size of the shock (10$, 20$, and 30$ shock respectively) and duration of the shock (1, 2, and 3 quarters). in each scenario we also assume a (incremental) 5% shock to the Dollar.
Results. According to the model, the duration of the oil shock and the Dollar are relevant. If the oil shock is persistent and coupled with a Dollar shock, than growth can take a hit, the unemployment rate can trend higher, and core PCE can disinflate a bit more quicly than in the baseline. For transparency: even in these scenarios, most of the action shown below comes from the Dollar, not from oil prices.
Figure 3. FRB-US: Baseline (red lines) and constructed scenarios (green and grey lines).
Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis.
Conclusion
For the time being, the model sends a clear signal: the Federal Reserve is in a position where it can neither cut nor raise rates. While multiple scenarios remain possible going forward, the current baseline points to a policy stance of remaining on hold.