The new FRB-US baseline is similar to the previous runs.
If the reader has questions, please direct them to our FRB-US specialist: Tilda Horvath (tilda.horvath@underlyinginflation.com). Tilda has programmed FRB-US at the Board and managed the model for almost 20 years. We remind the reader that we run ad-hoc scenarios using FRB-US free of charge. Do not be shy.
New Assumptions
We have revised the baseline under the following assumptions: real GDP growth of 2.7% QoQ SAAR in Q3, an average unemployment rate of 4.2% in Q3, and core PCE inflation of 2.6% QoQ SAAR in Q3. In addition, we have updated oil prices and U.S. Treasury yields to reflect current market pricing.
The New Baseline
Figure 1 presents the revised baseline (red lines) alongside the most recent SEP projections (blue lines and bands).
Despite incorporating a substantial amount of new information, the model baseline remains broadly similar to the previous one. The path for real GDP growth is largely unchanged and remains close to the SEP projections, while the path for the unemployment rate is essentially identical. The main discrepancy continues to concern core PCE inflation, which the model does not project to return to target by 2028, but instead sees remaining above target at around 2.5%.
As a result, the implied path for the federal funds rate remains slightly more hawkish than the SEP path. This is not a new feature of the model and has been present for several forecast rounds.
The question then becomes whether this result justifies a rate hike. There are a few considerations to keep in mind. First, strictly speaking, the model does not imply a hike in Q3 and therefore does not point to a rate increase at the September meeting. It is true, however, that the federal funds rate is slightly above the SEP level in 2026 and remains roughly one hike above the SEP path in both 2027 and 2028, precisely because inflation remains persistently above target.
So far, the FOMC has essentially interpreted this configuration as consistent with waiting, with the federal funds rate following a broadly flat or sideways path and the Fed remaining on hold. Viewed through the lens of this model, however, one rate hike between now and the end of 2026 cannot be ruled out entirely.
There are two important qualifications. First, it remains extremely difficult to justify more than one hike. Regardless of how the results are interpreted, multiple rate hikes do not appear realistic through the lens of this model. Second, as we show in the second part of this note, when we turn to the alternative scenarios, incorporating the potential downward revision to the core PCE inflation path associated with the BEA methodological changes removes even the case for a single hike. Under that scenario, the implied federal funds rate path could actually move slightly below the SEP path.
Putting everything together, the most cautious interpretation remains that the Fed stays on hold. A single hike cannot be ruled out, but anything beyond that is very difficult to reconcile with the model.
Figure 1. SEP forecast (blue lines and bands) and FRB-US forecast (red lines)

Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis. Core inflation refers to core PCE price inflation. The blue lines and bands represent the latest SEP projections, while the red lines depict the “inconsistent FRB-US” forecast—i.e., the model-based baseline without the Fed staff’s add-factors used to align with the latest SEP. This forecast has been updated as outlined in the text.
We remind readers that all the details of our FRB run are available on our website, where they can also construct their own simulated scenarios by introducing shocks through our “Build Your Scenario” tool.

