We show that the new run of FRB-US is in line with the December SEP, and that Pi* can be estimated at 2.5% in 2024:Q1. We discuss under what conditions a March cut will be on the table.
If the reader has questions, please direct them to our FRB-US specialist: Tilda Horvath (tilda.horvath@underlyinginflation.com). Tilda has programmed FRB-US at the Board and managed the model for almost 20 years. We remind the reader that we run ad-hoc scenarios using FRB-US free of charge. Do not be shy.
FRB-US – the new run
Strong economy until 2024H2, disinflation as in the SEP, similar FF rate path. Figure 1 shows the latest run of FRB-US (the red lines) vs the December SEP (the blue dots). Compared to the previous run, the model is based on a revised Q3 real GDP growth as published by the BEA, lower unemployment rate in Q4, and an assumption for core PCE prices at 2.2% in Q4 (QoQ saar) and 2.5% in Q1. In other words, this run is a mix of hard-data (Q3 in sample) plus some educated guesses for the unemployment rate in Q4 and core PCE in Q4 and Q1 (we are currently assuming the following MoM profile for core PCE: 6bp in Nov, 16bp in Dec, 32bp in Jan, 18bp in Feb, and 18bp in Mar).
The takeaway is that according to FRB-US, growth can surprise again to the upside (the model now expects real GDP growth at 3.0% in Q4 QoQ saar), before decelerating in the second half of 2024. Overall, the profile of real GDP growth is similar to the SEP, but remains less optimistic after 2024. The profile of core PCE price inflation is in line with the SEP throughout the forecasting horizon, while the unemployment rate continues to trend higher (reminder: U* in FRB-US is at 4.5% vs 4.0% in the SEP). Consequently, the path of the FF rate is very similar to the new SEP.
Figure 1. Figure 1. SEP forecast (blue dots) and “inconsistent” FRB-US simulation (red line)
Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed as YoY. Core inflation is core PCE price inflation. The blue dots show the latest SEP. The red line shows the “inconsistent FRB-US” forecast (the current baseline), that is the model-based forecast removing the “add-factors” put by the Fed staff to match the latest SEP, updated as specified in the text.
Pi* – where is it?
We estimate pi* at 2.5% in 2024:Q1. We have previously explained the importance of pi* in the Fed staff forecast (see here, and here). While still early, we have tried to fast forward the information set of the models to the end of 2024:Q1 and re-estimate pi*. We estimate that the YoY of core PCE price inflation will be at 2.5% at the end of 2024:Q1. Conditional on stable expectations and gentle wage disinflation: (i) the trend models are likely to estimate pi* at 2.5% (see figure here), (ii) the Fed-CIE is likely to signal a level of expectations consistent with 2¼ percent in core PCE space (see figure here), and (iii) the “OUI” general equilibrium model could estimate pi* at 2.7% (see figure here). Putting everything together, we estimate that pi* will be around 2.5% in Q1, two tenths lower than in Q4.
Figure 2. Estimate of underlying inflation (pi*).
Conclusion
Cutting in March: the dovish and hawkish case. The FOMC reaction function continues to be very similar to the (FRB-US) model. As such, we take the model predictions very seriously. The point of this note is that through the lenses of the model, a more aggressive Fed (more cuts than signaled in the December SEP) is unlikely to be driven by faster disinflation (at this point, the forecast would need to go below target). Rather, it would require a larger increase of the unemployment rate. In other words, one can take the view of more cuts than in the SEP but according to the model this will occur only in case of hard landing (a recession that pushes the unemployment rate above 4% in 2024). The other dimension to evaluate is that pi* is, in our estimates, likely to remain well above target in Q1, calling for some prudence or implicitly accepting a higher target. Putting everything together, we are not surprised by the contradictory communication of FOMC participants in the last few days. As we wrote in the pre-FOMC meeting package, we are in a “temptation island”: the data says “not yet, not even in Q1” but it seems that lots of FOMC participants (including Powell) cannot wait to cut.