US: FRB Update – The Iran War Scenario

Some of you, after reviewing the new FRB model baseline, asked whether we could circulate a scenario simulating the effects of a protracted conflict in Iran. As always, there is some uncertainty regarding how best to model a war shock. In this case, however, we decided to model it as a combination of a $25 per barrel exogenous oil price shock and a 10 percent appreciation of the U.S. dollar which could be the outcome of a protracted conflict.

As a reminder, the current baseline assumes that the average price of crude oil (average, not end-of-period) in Q1 2026 is a little above $70 per barrel. Current price levels are therefore still broadly consistent with the baseline assumptions. If the conflict were to persist, however, and oil prices were to remain at current levels—or move even higher—then the scenario presented below could become a realistic one even for the FOMC next quarter.

The (Protracted) Iran War Scenario

Figure 1 shows the current model baseline (red line) and the simulated scenario (grey line). In general, the combination of these two shocks is dovish, as both shocks are net negatives for growth. Oil shocks are typically relatively small for the U.S. economy, but at this magnitude their effects become more meaningful. The same applies to the dollar shock.

In terms of growth, GDP could end up lower by as much as half a percentage point relative to the baseline. The unemployment rate in the scenario would not spike dramatically, but it would be approximately three tenths of a percentage point higher than in the baseline. Of these three tenths, roughly two tenths are attributable to the dollar shock.

Figure 1.  FRB-US: Protracted Iran war scenario (gray) and baseline (red)

Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis. Core inflation refers to core PCE price inflation.

Figure 2 below shows the impulse response function of the output gap and core inflation to a dollar shock. A 20 percent dollar shock reduces the output gap by roughly six tenths. In the scenario described above, a 10 percent dollar shock therefore implies about three tenths less in the output gap, or roughly 15–20 basis points higher unemployment (via Okun’s law). The remainder of the effect on the unemployment rate comes from the oil shock.

Figure 2. IRFs to a 20pct Dollar shock (PING program in FRB-US)

Overall, under this scenario the Fed could adopt a somewhat more dovish stance in 2026, adding roughly one additional rate cut, and by the end of 2028 the cumulative number of cuts could be about two higher than in the baseline (Figure 1). To be clear, we are not suggesting that this scenario represents the new baseline. Rather, we are simply noting that if the conflict were to persist, this scenario could plausibly become the new baseline.

The  March SEP

As for the March meeting, we continue to believe that the baseline we circulated remains realistic, even after today’s employment report. The report was certainly negative, though somewhat less so when examined in non-seasonally-adjusted terms and in the context of the trajectory of the first two months of the year, which in our view remains broadly consistent with that observed in 2025 (see here). 

We do not expect the FOMC to over-react to today’s jobs data. The only meaningful change that could occur is that the Fed might signal two cuts for 2026 instead of one in the new SEP, bringing it closer to the December projections.

We will circulate our pre-FOMC meeting package at the beginning of next week.

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