US: Expectations are Dropping, So What?

“Not much for now” is the answer. In this note we explain why, in our view and estimates, the drop in expectations does not have meaningful implications for the Fed staff forecast (as inferred from the minutes), at least for now. The intuition is that the Fed staff judgmental forecast and especially the estimate of pi* was already quite generous (meaning lower than the model-based evidence). We also suggest under what conditions a drop in expectation might drive a lower forecast in the future by explaining the step-by-step effects on each model maintained by the Fed staff and the reasoning behind the judgmental forecast. In any case, the main takeaway for now is that you should not pay much attention because, as mentioned, it is more noise than signal. (Stop here if not interested in the details).

The evidence

In recent weeks some surveys have shown a decline in long-term expectations. For instance, in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for Q1, over the next 10 years (2023 to 2032), the forecasters predict headline CPI inflation will be at an annual-average rate of 2.37 percent. The corresponding estimate for 10-year annual-average PCE inflation is 2.15 percent (Figure 1 below). These 10-year projections are 0.58 percentage point and 0.43 percentage point lower than those of the previous survey. The drop in median PCE is particularly relevant because, in our experience, this series is one of those the staff takes more signal from.

Figure 1. Projection for the 10-year annual-average rate of PCE inflation.

Note: the red line shows the median while the gray bands show the interquantile range. Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters, Philadelphia Fed, 2023Q1 available here.

Similar evidence comes from the NY Fed survey of consumers (see here) in which median three-year ahead expectations have dropped in recent months and it is back to pre-Covid levels.

How the drop in expectations will affect the Fed staff models and forecast

In our experience, the drop in long-term expectations will affect some of the staff models. It will also affect the judgmental forecast, although only indirectly. We review each step below.

The Fed CIE

The first model affected by the drop in expectations is the so-called “Fed-CIE” or “Common Inflation Expectations” model. We have updated our mixed-frequency Dynamic Factor Model (DFM) to nowcast the Fed-CIE, given the new readings in expectations. Our results are presented below.

Figure 2. Published Fed-CIE and our model-based nowcast

Note: the Figure shows the published Fed Common Inflation Expectations (CIE) index (the thick blue bar), and our Dynamic Factor Model (DFM) nowcasts (the black circles). Both series are displayed at quarterly frequency. The latest published quarter of the Fed-CIE is 2022:Q4. The latest circle in the Figure shows our nowcast for 2023:Q1. The dashed-blue lines are estimated confidence intervals. The Fed-CIE model is a DFM that includes a large number of measures of inflation expectations. The estimated common factor (which is specified as an autoregressive process of order 5) is projected on a chosen measure of long-term inflation expectations (the SPF PCE 10 years). By construction, the level of the common factor cannot be interpreted because the underlying series are normalized at the beginning of estimation. Instead, the level of the common factor can be compared to its own history.

Our model estimates that the Fed-CIE has dropped in 2023:Q1, consistent with the downward movement in survey-based measures of expectations. According to our model, the level of the Fed CIE is estimated at 2.25 (C.I. 2.32-2.19) in Q1, down compared to last quarter. (Reminder: the level of the Fed-CIE is meaningless because the series are normalized before estimation). We estimate that the current level of inflation expectations is broadly consistent with a reading of core PCE price inflation of about 2½ percent.

We expect the Fed staff to continue to convey the message that expectations are broadly stable / “anchored” and consistent with a level of observed inflation a bit above target. The Fed-CIE is a synthetic index used by the Fed staff to summarize the movements of a large set of indicators (survey-based, market-based, short-term, long-term, etc..). In our experience, the CIE is used as a guide to answer two questions: (i) are expectations “anchored” (a crucial assumptions in Phillips-curve models), and (ii) are they anchored to a level consistent with the 2% target? In this sense, the recent drop of the CIE is, in our view, welcome by the Fed staff as it brings expectations to a level closer to target and it reinforces the conviction that expectations are broadly anchored.

The Trend models

The second set of models affected by the drop in expectations are the trend models. We have updated our set of trend inflation models which mimic Fed staff Rudd (2020). (As a reminder, some of the models use expectations as a proxy for the trend itself. What the econometric estimation does one way or the other is to provide a projection of a particular measure of expectation in core PCE price inflation space). Figure 3 shows the latest run of the models, including 2023:Q1 in sample. According to the latest run, the average across models is slightly lower in 2023:Q1 than the previous quarter, driven by a downward revision of the (SPF and CIE) Phillips curve trend models.

Figure 3. Trend inflation models.

Note: the chart shows the estimated trend inflation from 11 econometric models. The models are split into three groups. The first group is a collection of Phillips-curve (PC) type of trend inflation models in which a measure of long-term inflation expectations is used as a proxy of trend inflation. The second group is a collection of state-space unobserved component models in which we have modelled trend inflation either as a smooth trend or as an augmented local level. Finally, the third group of models is a collection of Time Varying Parameters Vector AutoRegressive models (TVP-VAR) with different endogenous variables. This set of models follows the FEDS Note by Rudd (2020) “Underlying Inflation: Its Measurement and Significance”. The Fed staff assumption about the level of underlying inflation (set at 1.8 percent until end of 2021) is inferred from Laubach et al. (2014) “Long-term Inflation Expectations and Risks to the Inflation Outlook“. The Fed staff has revised its assumption of pi* in December 2021, as per the FOMC minutes.

Ok, but then… what? Ultimately, it’s about pi*.

In our view, the answer to the question “ok, but then… what?” is “not much for now” because the movement in expectations mitigates an existing tension in the Fed staff judgmental forecast. Without entering too much into the details, each round the Fed staff has to make a call about pi* (or “underlying inflation”), the crucial variable for the dynamics of core PCE in the medium-term (please remember that, unsurprisingly, the FOMC changed tone drastically in December 2021, precisely when the Fed staff revised up its estimate of pi* for the first time – see the minutes here). The literature suggests that the estimate of pi* should rely on three pillars: (i) measures of inflation expectations, (ii) measures of trend inflation, and (iii) the general equilibrium of the economy considering the interaction between pi* and U*. Figure 4 shows the updated slide from our Pre-FOMC Meeting Package in which we summarize the signals from the three pillars, together with the Fed staff estimate (again, as inferred by reverse engineering the forecast from the minutes). In our estimate, the Fed staff is estimating pi* at 2.6% (for the record, FRB-US estimates pi* (or “PTR” in the model) at 2.5% in the latest publicly available run). The staff estimate is, in our view, a bit below the average across the three pillars, although the recent drop in expectations has reduced the distance, as previously mentioned. In any case, in our view, the risks around the Fed staff estimate of pi* remain to the upside.

Figure 4. Updated slide #26 from our “Pre-January 2023 FOMC Meeting Package”

Conclusion

For now, you can forget about expectations. As explained in this note, the drop in expectations brings the Fed staff estimate of pi* closer to the model-based evidence. As such, in our experience, the staff will not have a meaningful incentive to change its judgmental forecast, especially considering the strength of the incoming data. Going forward, a downward revision of pi* (which in our view is a necessary condition for a real FOMC “pivot”) will require that all pillars (trend-based measures, the CIE, and the general equilibrium) will revise down their estimate, as in this moment they are all well above target. Translated: this cannot happen with a single NFP or CPI print; it will require few/several more months of cooperating data.

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