Two Fed Notes on Inflation, Supply, and Demand Factors – A Discussion

Keep in mind

What happened since Covid is now pretty clear: about half of the increase in (core) inflation is driven by negative supply shocks and half by positive demand shocks. However, when looking forward the picture remains unclear. In fact, the theory and some preliminary empirical evidence suggest that the expected increase in supply in some sectors and the spending shift across sectors do not necessarily translate into a lower aggregate inflation. The main takeaway is that the Fed staff appears unsure about the possible deceleration in inflation going forward. For this reason, in our view the Fed staff will continue to convey a very hawkish message until a clear and convincing evidence of slowdown will emerge, even at the cost of overdoing it.

A little model

Assume the economy has two sectors, “G” (goods) and “S” (services). Assume that an exogenous shock (i.e. “lockdowns”) reduces supply in both sectors and shifts consumption from “S” to “G”. What happens to the aggregate price level? The answer to this question depends on the degree of nominal rigidities in each sector.  Because “G” experiences a negative supply shock and a positive demand shock, the price level increases. On the other hand, the behavior of the price level in “S” is unclear and depends on the relative magnitude of the two shocks (demand/supply). In a nut shell, this is what happened during the pandemic: in some sectors (mainly goods) prices increased because demand went up while supply remained roughly constant (i.e. “furniture” sector) or contracted (i.e. “auto” sector”). On the other hand, the price level in other sectors (mainly services) contracted little during the pandemic because supply and demand both decreased (and because of downward nominal rigidities). The aggregate result was, needless to say, largely inflationary.

Note: using movements in prices/quantities, Shapiro (2022) estimates that about half of the increase in (core) inflation since the beginning of the pandemic is due to supply factors, and half to demand factors.

What happens when the economy normalizes, supply comes back and consumption shifts back from “G” to “S”?

Here is where it gets interesting and the final result remains unclear, as discussed by Datta et al. (2022). In order to understand why, consider the following two factors:

  1. The increase in supply is disinflationary, unless demand increases more. Therefore, while in some sectors (mainly goods) the increase in supply can put downward pressure on prices because demand is falling, in other sectors (mainly services) the increase in demand is probably more than offsetting the increase in supply. Therefore, in the services sector the higher demand is exacerbating the existing bottlenecks and driving up prices again (Datta et al. (2022)). In other words, because the increase in supply comes with a shift in the composition of spending across sectors, the final result on the aggregate price level depends on the relative price elasticity across sectors.
  1. The shift in consumption from “G” to “S” is in theory disinflationary in the goods sector, unless prices are downward nominally rigid. Indeed, Datta et al. (2022) show that in some “G” sectors (see for instance Figure 11 of Datta et al. (2022) reported below), demand has already returned to its pre-Covid trend but the price level has been unaffected. (Admittedly, the behavior of the price level in “Furniture” can be explained by a continuous a negative supply shock and not only by downward rigidities. In any case, even conditional on this hypothesis, it is hard to see any effect of the large negative demand shock on the price level).

Does the literature offer any guidance?

The degree of price rigidities across sectors, the frequency of price changes, the degree of downward nominal rigidity, and the frequency of price changes according to the inflation regimes are still subject to research (see for instance Bils and Klenow (2004), Gagnon (2009), Nakamura and Steinsson (2013), Nakamura and Steinsson (2019), Gautier et a. (2022)). For instance, while some studies (Bils and Klenow (2004)) have documented that the frequency of price changes is higher in goods sectors, Gagnon (2009) documented that the frequency of price decreases is lower in a higher inflation environment (a result somehow challenged by the evidence in Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)).

When looking forward, the logic and the empirical evidence suggest price accelerations in the services sector driven by higher demand and still constrained supply. On the other hand, the extent to which consumers goods prices will fall remains an open question because it is unclear the extend of the increase in supply, the speed of the rebalancing across sectors, and the degree of downward rigidity in prices. (note: core goods represent about 27% of core CPI. Therefore, conditional on core services increasing at the rate of the last 3 months, the deflation necessary in the goods sector for aggregate inflation to converge back to target seems unlikely in the near-term, even considering the recent news on higher inventories).

How to read the FRB note

As usual, the FEDS notes do not represent the Fed staff view (nor the FOMC). However, in our view they are often very influential internally. The fact that 3 authors of the FRB note are FRB Section Chiefs implies, in our view, a high degree of influence of this note which we can therefore take as a proxy of the Fed staff view.

Unfortunately, Datta et al. (2022) are vague in their conclusion and do not specify a baseline scenario but they seem to lean in favor of a relatively fast resolution of the bottlenecks and a fast disinflation. In our view, the conclusion of Datta et al. (2022) is in line with the Fed staff core PCE price inflation forecast (as inferred from the FOMC minutes) which has been consistently below the forecast of our “main” model. In other words, the Fed staff continues to think that supply will help in the coming months putting downward pressure on goods prices and that services prices will accelerate only little from here. Nevertheless, in our view the Fed staff has made a “low conviction” call, as inferred from Datta et al. (2022) and it has already mis-timed the (possible) increase in supply in 2021 and early 2022. For this reason, as previously communicated we continue to believe that the FOMC will remain hawkish until disinflation will be evident, including in measures of long-term expectations.

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