Tariffs Update and Literature Review – Fiscal and Fiscal

Preamble about Tariffs. We have not yet updated our baseline forecast or model projections, as we continue to expect that trade tensions between the U.S. and Mexico/Canada will be resolved, along with any potential tariffs on EU exports (for reference, see this 2019 Trump’s tweet). As a general rule, we only update our models and forecasts once it becomes clear that a policy is credible. The situation with China is more complex, and some tariffs may ultimately remain in place. However, in the absence of new announcements, we anticipate only a very limited impact on GDP growth and core PCE price inflation, though uncertainty remains high.

Review of Two Academic Papers on Inflation and Fiscal Policy. The first “Recalculating Sargent and Wallace’s “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” by Ivan Werning (MIT), revisits the classic 1981 work of Sargent and Wallace, confirming and extending their findings. The study reinforces the idea that if fiscal policy does not adjust in response to monetary policy changes (a scenario known as fiscal dominance), attempts to reduce inflation by slowing money growth may be effective in the short term but could ultimately lead to higher inflation in the future. The second paper “Fiscal policy and inflation: accounting for non-linearities in government debt” by Cristina Checherita-Westphal (ECB) and Tom Pesso (Pompeu Fabra) provides evidence of non-linearities in the relationship between fiscal policy and inflation within the euro area. The authors find that fiscal stimulus tends to generate higher inflation in high-debt economies compared to those with lower debt levels. This underscores the importance of considering public debt and monetary policy conditions when analyzing the inflationary effects of fiscal policy.

 

Paper #1: Werning (2024)

“Recalculating Sargent and Wallace’s “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” by Ivan Werning (MIT) revisits Sargent and Wallace’s seminal 1981 work, which highlighted the constraints fiscal policy imposes on monetary policy. Werning builds on their framework by analyzing policy through two complementary lenses: (i) Interest rates as the primary instrument, and (ii) Seigniorage paths. His findings reaffirm Sargent and Wallace’s conclusions: while monetary policy can temporarily reduce inflation, inflation must rise later to compensate. Additionally, under fiscal dominance, changes in monetary policy can result in persistently higher inflation across all periods.

What the paper does and main results

Sargent and Wallace argued that under fiscal dominance, attempts to reduce inflation via lower money growth may succeed briefly but ultimately drive inflation higher—sometimes backfiring entirely.

Werning revisits this using an interest rate-based approach, now central to modern policy. He frames interest rates as a tax-like tool on real money holdings, linking monetary policy to public finance.

His analysis confirms that reducing inflation today often necessitates higher future inflation due to the intertemporal budget constraint. Using an inverse-U-shaped Laffer curve, he shows that if inflation is on the increasing side, this trade-off holds. But on the “bad” side, rate hikes worsen inflation across all periods—validating Sargent and Wallace’s “spectacular” scenario (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Laffer curves for the interest rate approach.

Beyond interest rates, Werning explores seigniorage as a driver of inflation under fiscal dominance. He argues that inflation depends more on the timing of seigniorage than money growth alone.

If the discount rate on future seigniorage is low, inflation can be reduced by front-loading seigniorage—contradicting Sargent and Wallace’s view that inflation must eventually rise.

Revisiting their “spectacular” example, Werning shows that inflation outcomes hinge on equilibrium selection. Using an alternative parameterization, he presents a case where inflation rises without equilibrium shifts, refining Sargent and Wallace’s core insight.

A critique of the paper

Werning’s paper is a valuable contribution, offering a modernized interpretation of Sargent and Wallace’s seminal work. His alternative perspectives—interest rates and seigniorage—clarify key mechanisms and connect their findings to contemporary monetary policy debates.

However, some limitations remain. His reinterpretation of the “spectacular” example raises questions about equilibrium selection. Policy-makers may struggle to identify whether the economy is on the “bad” side of the Laffer curve, complicating policy implementation.

Additionally, the paper’s seigniorage-based framework assumes a particular form of government financing constraints. The degree to which real-world central banks face these exact constraints depends on institutional structures. For instance, his results may not directly apply to currency unions or advanced economies with independent central banks.

Policy implications

Werning’s analysis underscores the need for coordinated monetary-fiscal policy. Without credible fiscal adjustments, monetary tightening risks raising long-term inflation rather than controlling it.

A key insight is that policy-makers must assess their position on the interest rate Laffer curve. If on the “bad” side, rate hikes may worsen inflation, complicating debt sustainability and monetary strategy, particularly in high-debt regimes prone to fiscal dominance.

His findings highlight that monetary and fiscal policies are interdependent—effective inflation control requires alignment between central banks and fiscal authorities.

Paper #2: Checherita-Westphal and Pesso (2024)

“Fiscal policy and inflation: accounting for non-linearities in government debt” by Cristina Checherita-Westphal (ECB) and Tom Pesso (Pompeu Fabra) explores the relationship between fiscal policy and inflation in the euro area, depending on the public debt level. Using a panel of 12 euro area countries from 1999 to 2022, the paper finds evidence of non-linearities: fiscal stimulus produces higher inflation in high-debt regimes compared to low-debt contexts. The authors emphasise the importance of accounting for public debt and monetary policy conditions in analysing fiscal policies’ inflationary effects.

What the paper does and main results

The study aims to distinguish between the inflationary effects of fiscal interventions under different debt regimes. Discretionary fiscal policy is proxied using the Eurosystem Working Group of Public Finance (WGPF)’s measure based on changes in tax revenue and expenditure relative to nominal potential growth. To address potential endogeneity issues, a second measure “purges” the proxy of contemporaneous macroeconomic developments (GDP growth, output gaps). The authors use state-dependent local projections to account for non-linearities related to public debt, monetary policy stances, and business cycle positions.

The findings indicate that fiscal stimulus generates stronger inflationary effects in high-debt economies. For example, a 1% GDP fiscal stimulus results in an additional 0.4 percentage points (pp) of cumulative headline inflation after five years in high-debt regimes (Figure 2). These effects are particularly evident in the third and fourth years following a fiscal intervention, and robust to using the “purged” fiscal measure or a panel of 16 OECD countries.

Figure 2. Impact of fiscal policy on inflation

The paper further investigates non-linearity given a continuous measure of debt levels. Inflation increases by 0.1pp four years after a 1% of GDP fiscal stimulus in a country where debt is around 70% of GDP (sample mean), and by an additional 0.2pp if debt is one standard deviation higher (additional 35pp of GDP). This analysis simultaneously accounts for the indirect effects of the fiscal shock interacted with the predetermined euro area-wide monetary policy stance and the state of the economy (output gap). Higher interest rates mitigate the inflationary impact of fiscal interventions. Similarly, though less robust, fiscal stimulus effects vary depending on the economic cycle, with disinflationary effects of fiscal stimulus during high output gaps.

A critique of the paper

While the authors attempt to control for endogeneity, the identification strategies rely heavily on discretionary fiscal policy proxies, which may still include endogenous components. This limitation weakens the causal interpretation of the results. Also, different fiscal instruments likely have different short-term effects on inflation, motivating further analysis of compositional effects of a fiscal stimulus on high- versus low-debt regimes.

Policy implications

The findings underscore the importance of fiscal discipline in avoiding inflationary pressures. High-debt countries should exercise caution when implementing fiscal stimulus, as it exacerbates inflationary dynamics and risks destabilizing inflation expectations. Targeted fiscal measures with minimal inflationary impacts, such as investment-focused spending rather than broad-based stimulus, could mitigate these risks.

Finally, the paper highlights the critical role of monetary policy in managing inflationary spillovers from fiscal interventions. Coordinated fiscal-monetary policy frameworks are essential, especially in high-debt scenarios.

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