Managing or Taking a Risk? The outcomes of the September FOMC meeting were unequivocally dovish. The revised statement, the updated dot plot, and Chair Powell’s remarks all emphasized only one side of the Fed’s dual mandate—employment—while effectively downplaying or dismissing inflation risks altogether.
We see a couple of concerns arising from this stance:
- Relative to relative to the June SEP, the revised projections for 2026 and 2027 show higher real GDP growth, a lower unemployment rate, and higher (or unchanged) core PCE inflation. Yet, despite these revisions, the projected federal funds rate is lower in both years. This internal inconsistency is difficult to justify and, in our view, undermines the coherence of the new dot plot even considering the revised reaction function and the risks.
- The SEP and Chair Powell’s assessment holds conditional on a key assumption: underlying inflation (pi*) is at 2%, which to us is a big question mark at the moment.
Put it simply: yes, the FOMC is managing the labor market risk. But according to the models, it is also taking a big risk with inflation. Time will tell.
Statement
The new statement is unequivocally dovish. It places exclusive emphasis on risks to the labor market, while largely downplaying concerns related to inflation. The FOMC appears confident that inflation will converge back to the 2% target over time.
The dots
Internally Inconsistent, Taking a Risk. Figure 1 compares the June SEP (blue line), the pre-FOMC FRB-US model run (red line), the pre-FOMC FRB-US model run using a non-inertial Taylor rule (red dashed line), and the September SEP (blue dots).
The good news is that the revised federal funds rate projections (“dots”) now appear consistent with a non-inertial Taylor rule in 2025 and 2026. Additionally, the federal funds rate remains above neutral in all forecast years, as we had anticipated. We will now proceed under the working assumption that the FOMC’s reaction function has shifted.
That said, two concerns emerge from the new set of projections:
First, relative to the June SEP, the revised projections for 2026 and 2027 show higher real GDP growth, a lower unemployment rate, and higher (or unchanged) core PCE inflation. Yet, despite these revisions, the projected federal funds rate is lower in both years. This internal inconsistency is difficult to justify and, in our view, undermines the coherence of the new dot plot.
Second, assuming a non-inertial Taylor rule is now operative, the gap between the model-implied path and the SEP projections has widened in 2027 (and 2028). If growth remains solid and the unemployment rate stabilizes, the risk of inflation staying significantly above target has increased materially. In other words, the FOMC is taking a considerable risk, one that hinges on the assumption that underlying inflation (pi*) is anchored at 2%—an assumption we discuss in more detail in video we circulated recently (see here).
Are they right? Our models suggest otherwise.
Figure 1. Comparison between the June SEP (blue line), pre-FOMC FRB-US model run (red line), pre-FOMC FRB-US model run using a non-inertial Taylor rule (red dashed line), and the September SEP (blue dots).
Q&As
Question: In the SEP you constantly forecast to hit target two years ahead but you never got to target. Is the 2% still believable?
Powell. “You’re right. It does say [the SEP, ndr] we’re going to get to 2% inflation in 2028. But that’s, you know, that’s literally how you put the projections together. You’re writing down a rate pass which is designed to create over the course of the SEP time frame. […] So that’s all that is. You know, we don’t… no one really knows where the economy will be in 3 years. But the nature of the exercise is to break down policy that you believe would return to the 2% goal over at least by the end of the exercise.”
Comment: At last, there is growing recognition that inflation has remained above target for an extended period, and that both the Fed staff and the FOMC have repeatedly erred in the same direction (see our note here). We reiterate our message: the FOMC’s forecast is predicated on the assumption that underlying inflation (pi*) is anchored at 2%—an assumption that, in our view, remains highly questionable at this stage.
Question: What if inflation picks up more?
Powell. “Our expectation has been that inflation will move up this year, but that is basically because of the effects on goods prices. […] And those will turn out to be a one-time price increase, as opposed to creating an inflationary process. That’s been our forecast. […] Our job is literally to make sure that this is what happens and we will do that job. The situation we’re in is that we see inflation, we continue to expect it to move up. Maybe not as high as we would have expected to move up a few months ago. The pass through of the tariffs into inflation has been slower and smaller and the labor market has softened, so that the case for persistent inflation has diminished. […] Our framework says that when our two goals are in tension… this is quite an unusual situation. How do we decide what to do? Because our tools can’t fix two things at once. What we do is we ask which is further from the goal and how long is it expected to get to the goal. […] Our policy has been really skewed toward inflation for a long time. Now we see downside risk in the labor market. And so we are moving in direction of a more neutral policy.”
Comment: Once again, Chair Powell’s assessment holds conditional on two key assumptions: that inflation expectations remain well anchored and that underlying inflation (pi*) is at 2%. Under these conditions, it is plausible to interpret the current shock to marginal costs as a one-time level shift in the price level. However, it is worth noting that there are also compelling arguments to suggest that this may represent a shock to the slope of the Phillips curve. We intend to explore this possibility in a forthcoming note. In short, the FOMC appears to be prioritizing risks to the labor market while simultaneously taking on greater risk with respect to inflation.