Hard to rationalize. To us, the outcome of the September FOMC is very hard to rationalize. With or without FRB, we are puzzled. The FOMC has decided to cut 50bps, more than expected by the model, given a higher expected unemployment rate. The difference is small in 2025 and 2026 with the new path of the FF rate being lower than the model by about 1 cut in each year.
Having said that, we list our series of doubts and some possible ways to rationalize the outcome of the FOMC:
- The new statement says that “The Committee has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent”. To us, it remains unclear what has changed between July and now to gain “greater confidence”, given the incoming data. For the record: our estimate of pi* (at 2.45%) is nearly identical to the time of the July meeting. Unfortunately, Powell did not clarify this point. The only way to rationalize this move is to assume that inflation is now “low enough” for the Fed not to be an issue, although the baseline is to remain above target.
- The new dots (see Figure 1 below) are more dovish than FRB suggested, even conditional on the unemployment rate at 4.4% in 2024 and 2025. The only way to achieve that in the model is to use judgmental “add factors”. In other words, the only way to rationalize the new dots is to assume that the reaction function of the Fed has changed and it is less inertial. In general, this happens when the Fed becomes concerned about the labor market. Conditional on this, we cannot exclude other 50bps cut in the near future. (For the record: it is hard also to rationalize the September dots compared to the March dots. The two projections are very similar but we have now 50bps cut more in 2025).
- The new SEP shows a higher R* (Powell said “It feels to me the neutral rate is probably significantly higher than it was back” [before the pandemic, ndr]). While we have been in the “higher R* camp” for quite some time, we remain unsure how to rationalize an upward revision to R* with the need of a less inertial Fed (for the record: the “short-term R* story never made sense to us).
- The new FOMC participants’ assessments of uncertainty and risks shows a significant shift for core PCE from “weighted to the upside” to “broadly balanced”. We remain unsure what has triggered this change. A possible way to rationalize it is that the FOMC has implicitly accepted the risk that core inflation might remain a bit above target going forward.
In the end, where does the September FOMC leave us? It seems to us that the FOMC did not take out neither the slowdown/recession risk nor the inflation risk.
Statement
“Greater confidence”. To our eyes, the most significant change in the statement is that “The Committee has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent”. To us, it remains unclear what has changed between July and now to gain “greater confidence”. For the record: our estimate of pi* (at 2.45%) is nearly identical to the time of the July meeting.
The dots
Concerned about the labor market. Figure 1 shows a comparison between the June SEP (solid blue line), the FRB-US model pre-FOMC run (dashed red line), and the new September SEP (blue dots). Overall, the new dots are more dovish than the model, with the difference being about one cut more in each year. The difference comes from the fact the the FOMC now sees lower growth (and higher unemployment rate) than the model in each year.
Figure 1. Comparison between the June SEP (blue solid line), pre-FOMC FRB-US model run (red dashed line), and the September SEP (blue dots).
Q&As
Question: Are you sure to go back to 2% given the persistency of housing inflation?
Powell. “We know that market rents are doing what want them to do, which is to be moving up at relatively low levels, but they’re not rolling over. The leases that are rolling over are not coming down as much, and OER is coming in high. So, you know, it’s been slower than we expected. I think we now understand that it’s going to take some time for those lower market rents to get into this. But, you know, the direction of travel is clear […] I don’t think the outcome is in doubt again, as long as market rents remain under control, the outcome is not in doubt. I would say the rest of the portfolio, of the elements going into PCE inflation have behaved pretty well, you know, they have some volatility. We will get down to 2% inflation, I believe.”.
Comment: To us, Powell’s answer was a bit confusing. Sure, housing is persistent and somehow lagging. But the issue is not only housing. In fact, our distributions show the unweighted Kernels on purpose (see below the latest evidence for core PCE). And the issue has not changed: the distribution is still not consistent with 2%, with or without housing inflation in it.