The March 2024 FOMC round was about R* and the supply-side (higher Y*). There were two key moments in our view. First, in his prepared remarks Powell said: “participants generally revised up their growth projections since December reflecting the strength of incoming data, including data on labor supply”. Second, replying to a question Powell said: “In itself, strong job growth is not a reason for us to be concerned about inflation”. Putting together these words with the new dots (higher growth in each year, unemployment rate little changed, and higher R*), it is clear to us that Powell and the FOMC are onboard with the idea that the US economy is experiencing a positive supply shock (see our FRB-US notes here, here, and here) that is raising potential output (Y*). We discuss the implications below and, as usual, we comment the Q&As.
Dots plot
New SEP consistent with a positive supply shock. Compared to the December SEP, the new SEP shows higher GDP growth in each year, higher core PCE in 2024, higher FF rate in 2025 and 2026, and higher longer run FF rate.
In our pre-March 2024 FOMC meeting package (here), we signaled upside risks to growth and inflation. The dots are in line with our expectations for core PCE but they are higher than expected for GDP growth, especially in 2025 and 2026. This is (almost) equivalent to an upward revision to potential growth (the slope of Y*) even if it is not shown in the longer run dot, which is inconsistent at this point. Not only, but we also suspect (to be confirmed with the minutes) that the Fed staff might have revised up both the level and the slope of Y*, as suggested by FRB-US.
The FF rate dot in 2024 was a close call this round, while the 2025 and 2026 dots are higher than expected. Finally, we signaled the risk of an upward revision to the longer-run FF rate and it (finally) happened (for the record, the results of the FRB-US simulation assuming a higher R* are here).
Putting everything together, the FOMC seems to signal a continuation of the positive supply shock that we discussed recently: higher potential (Y*) driven by higher labor supply combined with a positive productivity shock (again see see our FRB-US notes here, here, and here), and ultimately higher R*. In a nutshell: the new SEP seems consistent with a strong positive supply shock (FRB-US once again anticipated it..).
Q&As
Question: Higher growth this year, higher core PCE but same FF rate. How is it possible?
Powell. “I pointed out in my opening remarks, we did mark up our growth forecast, and so have many other forecasters. […] And the inflation data came in a little higher, […] but nonetheless, we continue to make good progress bringing inflation down. […] we’re strongly committed to bringing inflation down to 2% over time, that is our goal, and we will achieve that goal. Markets believe we will achieve that goal and they should believe that because that’s what will happen over time. But we stress over time. And so, I think we’re making projections that do show that happening, and we’re committed to that outcome”.
Comment: Steve Liesman’s question is rational, and Chair Powell’s answer is a bit vague (at least to us). Indeed, it is quite difficult to rationalize the 2024 dot in a model which, conditional on a higher path in 2025 and 2026, would also call for a higher dot in 2024. One way of thinking about this is that the FOMC is telling a preference: they will not insist with the front-end of the curve, unless core PCE will re-accelerate sharply (which we exclude).
Question: How much of this year inflation is a one off? (asked twice)
Powell (first answer). “I would say the January number was very high. […] There’s reason to think that there could be seasonal effects there. But nonetheless, we don’t want to be completely dismissive of it. The February number was high, higher than expectations but core PCE in February [in our estimates, ndr] is not terribly high. So, it’s not like the January numbers, but I think the two of them together, and I think they haven’t really changed the overall story of inflation moving down gradually. […] We didn’t excessively celebrate the good inflation we got in the last seven months of last year. We didn’t take too much signal out of that. What you heard us saying was that we needed to see more […], we want to be careful about that decision. And we’re not going to overreact as well to these two months of data, nor are we going to ignore them”.
Powell (second answer). “I see the committee looking at the two months of data and asking the same question you’re asking. […] As I mentioned, you can look at January, which is very high reading and many people see the possibility of seasonal adjustment problems there. But again, you don’t want be dismissing the parts of the data that you don’t like. Then February wasn’t as high but it was high. So, the question is: what are we going to see? You know, we tend to see a little bit stronger inflation in the first half of the year, a little bit less strong later in the year. […] I don’t think we really know whether this is a bump on the road or something more. We’ll have to find out in the meantime, the economy is strong. The labor market is strong.”
Comment: A very complicated way to say the following: “we don’t really know, and in any case we largely discount any single CPI print because ultimately what matters is pi* (underlying inflation)”. That’s once again the cold truth, even if it is almost impossible to communicate it in a press conference.
Question: Higher longer run rates in the dots. Are rates going to be higher than pre-Covid going forward?
Powell. “I don’t think we know that. We think that rates were generally low during the pre-pandemic post global financial crisis era, for reasons that are mostly… you know, important slow-moving things like demographics and productivity and that sort of thing… things that don’t move quickly. But I don’t think we know. I mean, my instinct would be that rates will not go back down to the very low levels that we saw around the world […] at or below zero. […] I don’t see rates going back down to that level but I think there’s tremendous uncertainty around that”.
Comment: Has R* moved higher? We have firmly been in the “yes” camp. Welcome to our camp, Chair Powell. (For the record, we remind the reader that (s)he can find a PPT here that reviews the R* literature and recent empirical evidence).