Taking time.
The outcome of the July FOMC meeting was fully in line with our expectations. We expected the Committee to leave interest rates unchanged, and that is exactly what it did, for the reasons outlined in our pre-FOMC meeting package. Perhaps the only surprise was the press conference, which was not particularly hawkish. If anything, we would characterize it as broadly neutral, reflecting a clear “wait-and-see” approach.
From our perspective, the more surprising development was that, in the days leading up to the meeting, markets had assigned such a high probability to a rate hike. In our view, it would have been difficult to reconcile such a decision with the Federal Reserve’s reaction function, given the information available at the time.
More generally, we continue to believe that the FRB-US model provides a useful guide to interpreting the Fed’s policy decisions and that, for now, the Committee has simply chosen to wait. The fact that there were three dissenting votes does not materially change our assessment. Even so, it remains difficult to build a majority in favour of raising interest rates unless, as we have consistently argued, the incoming data surprise materially to the upside and push core PCE inflation above 3.5%. That remains a possible outcome, but it is not our baseline scenario at this stage. The incoming data over the next few months will naturally be crucial for the policy outlook. At the same time, we see a growing possibility, which is increasingly becoming our baseline scenario, that the Federal Reserve will ultimately leave interest rates unchanged throughout 2026. (Riccardo here. I would not take a September FOMC hike for granted at all. In fact, I think the probability that the FOMC remains on hold in September is higher than implied by current market pricing – the Q&A gave me the impression that Warsh would be comfortable with some tightening coming through the long end of the curve.)
Statement
The statement is nearly identical to the one released in June, and, in our view, there was no need to make any changes (one data point is… one data point).

FRB-US – A Usueful Guide
The figure below shows the latest run of the model for the four SEP variables, represented by the red lines, together with the latest SEP projections. We continue to believe that the model provides the best forecast available at this stage. The main source of uncertainty remains the future path of inflation, and only the incoming data will determine whether the model’s projections prove correct or whether inflation turns out to be somewhat more benign than currently anticipated by the model, thereby validating the Fed’s assessment.
Figure 1. Latest SEP vs FRB-US forecast

Q&As
Question: Do you need to raise rates to get inflation down to 2%?
Warsh. “So, that’s, that was the discussion in the last two days. Is that the dominant remedy if inflation continues to be elevated through the forecast period? Interest rates could well be part of that solution. But I wouldn’t say it’s in isolation. I tried to describe in my remarks today the point that I made to the oversight committees a couple of weeks ago. I think there was a misimpression by some in financial markets, by some households and businesses, that central bankers like me, we set a 2% inflation target, but maybe we were more tolerable of a somewhat higher inflation target. In economics, we’d call that the revealed preference. And so, it might have been rational for people to think, well, their inflation target’s somewhat higher. What I heard in the last two days, what I’ve heard in eight and a half weeks, is no. We will deliver the 2% inflation target. That is the committee’s definition of price stability. So one way, absent the tools that you reference, to ensure that we get there is ensure that expectations are centered around the right number. And I think we’ve made some progress on that. I am not suggesting we’re done on that. It’s worth reiterating. And ultimately, the business we’re in, Colby, is performance. We are going to be judged by how we perform. And that’s what we intend to do. The inflation target, making clear expectations, is one part of it. Making sure we demonstrate we’re responsible for it, we’re not blaming, is another. And our policy tools, like you referenced, is the third and equally consequential part.”
Comment: Certainly, inflation expectations matter. However, expectations are themselves largely shaped by actual and perceived inflation. One way or another, the Federal Reserve must either bring inflation down or hope that it moderates on its own. In any case, the impression is that Warsh does not mind at all some tightening of the long-end of the curve.
Question: Inflation seems driven by supply shocks. Does this lower the case for a hike?
Warsh. “First, on the premise of your question, it was almost as if you were listening to our discussion the last day and a half. A lot of our focus was on trying to understand and identify underlying inflation dynamics amid shocks. We take these shocks seriously. There have been a series of them that have been hitting this economy. We’re not looking through them and saying, ‘Oh, they don’t matter.’ What we’re trying to understand is to what extent are these shocks broadening in their effects, broadening in their impact on prices that are quite far removed from them. Our goal is to have growth that is broadening and inflation that is becoming more limited, more circumscribed. I’ll be the first to admit the shocks make this job and this policy conjuncture a little tougher, but that’s among the chief questions we’ve asked ourselves. And around the room, people have different views on it. I tend to think in the coming months we’re going to refine that view and have a better judgment, and we’re going to have market prices trying to help inform it too.”
Comment: Exactly. That is an excellent description of Warsh’s position. From a technical standpoint, it is entirely correct that a central bank may need to respond even to supply-side shocks.
Question: Is there a trade-off between price stability and full employment?
Warsh. “So let me go back to first principles, Nick. I don’t believe that either part of our mandate is generally at war with the other part. I do not believe that price stability and full employment are an either-or proposition. There have been policymakers over the last several generations who have thought that there is a strict trade-off there. That isn’t my judgment. In fact, my judgment is that if and when we deliver on our remit, we’re going to be satisfying both prongs. We’re going to have price stability and full employment. And in fact, if you want to do the most harm to the labor market, you would run a period of high inflation that’s variable, such that employers and businesses wouldn’t really know what’s going on.
So I think the two parts of our mandate are equally important. We have no legislative orphans here. I’ve been talking mostly about price stability because we’re doing pretty well collectively as a country, as policymakers, on the full employment side. But we’re doing considerably less well on prices. That’s why we describe them as elevated, and that’s what’s taken most of our discussion.
In terms of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, I think different tools work through different transmission mechanisms. Interest rates work through lending channels and credit channels, maybe confidence channels and foreign exchange. The balance sheet probably works through some other channels like signaling and portfolio balance. We’re keeping fully abreast of all these tools in making policy.
But if the suggestion is somehow that we’re going to be fine-tuning aggregate demand so it catches supply, that’s not my mental model. I don’t think we’re great in the fine-tuning business. We’re trying to get supply and demand in broad order. But really what we’re doing, as we sit here today at this press conference, is I think we’ve got a reasonable sense of what aggregate demand looks like in this economy. We’re inferring aggregate supply. We’re making a judgment about what productivity is. And in some sense, there’s a race between supply and demand. And the surge in business CapEx around AI is making that calculation a little harder to judge. But in the period ahead, we’re going to be trying to judge just that.”
Comment: A great deal of discussion to make a rather straightforward point that has long been established in the academic literature. There is no fundamental trade off between price stability and full employment. Such a trade off arises only when the central bank loses control of inflation and is subsequently forced to engineer a costly disinflation, as occurred during the 1970s. That is not the environment we are facing today. (Inflation can moderate via several channels, including FX, and not necessarily via the labor market.)
Question: The 2% target – what measures are you relying on?
Warsh. “I’ll give two answers. First, let me give the proper standard answer. The Federal Reserve every January outlines a Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. And in that strategy document, which I believe was dated January of this year, it describes a measure of PCE inflation as the objective function there. I have enough of my… so that’s our number, we’re sticking with it. Who knows, come after next January, what we might say about strategy. I suspect the task forces might have something to add.
But I’ll say this. Some version of the Lucas critique, some version of Goodhart’s law in economics, should remind us that when we talk about measures of inflation or something else, and we describe those measures as being consistent with our objectives, we might make them such that they’re not very good measures or very good objectives.
Broadly, if you said to me, standing in front of you, ‘I abide fully by the strategy document. We’re going to deliver 2% inflation and not a whisper more. But to achieve that, I’m looking at a broader set of inflation data than PCE.’ So, without sort of fully revealing my cards, I’m trying to understand, like my colleagues, what’s the underlying generalized change in prices that’s happening in the economy.
It is not a perfect science. I might have said 42 days ago, ‘I’ve got a task force for that.’ But we have a data project that’s trying to look and see whether we can’t separate the noise from the signal.
And so, if you would hear a message from me, yes, I care about what the PCE prints are. I care about what the contributions are from CPI and everything else. But my lens is broader than that, even though the remit is quite narrow.”
Comment: Our best guess is to monitor the evolution of pi*. At the moment, for the United States, it appears to be much closer to 3% than to 2%.