To keep in mind
Two newly released papers (SF Fed letter by Lansing (2022), and a paper by Eo et al. (2022)) indicate that the current inflationary shock is persistent. Goods inflation is likely transitory but moderating services inflation requires aggressive monetary policy. The risks to longer-term inflation remain to the upside.
What the papers do
The first paper (“Untangling Persistent versus Transitory Shocks to Inflation” by Kevin J. Lansing) is based on the idea that the correlation between current and past changes in inflation is informative about the likely path of future inflation. Lansing (2022) constructs two metrics of inflation persistence: (i) the correlation coefficient between consecutive changes of inflation, and (ii) the correlation coefficient between consecutive levels of inflation. (For the record: Jørgensen and Lansing (2022) show that the shock volatility ratio for the Stock-Watson model -defined as the standard deviation of persistent shocks divided by the standard deviation of transitory shocks- is directly linked to the correlation coefficient between consecutive changes in inflation, which is a measure of inflation persistence). The intuition is pretty simple: a stronger correlation between consecutive (levels or) changes in monthly inflation rates means that inflation changes are more likely to continue moving in the same direction in the future.
The second paper (“Goods inflation is likely transitory, but upside risks to longer-term inflation remain” by Yunjong Eo, Luis Uzeda, and Benjamin Wong) estimates trend inflation (i.e. the rate of inflation that would be expected to prevail if there were no temporary factors) in two macro sectors: goods and services. The exercise then decomposes the variance of aggregate trend inflation in its contributions (given that goods and services represent the entire consumption basket, the variance of aggregate trend inflation can be decomposed into the variance of each sector plus the correlation between them).
Results
Starting with the first paper, Lansing (2022) main result is reported below.
The persistence of inflation levels (blue line) was high during the Great Inflation of the 1970s when inflation itself was high. The level of inflation and its persistence both declined when the FOMC pursued an aggressive disinflation policy under Fed Chair Paul Volcker. The persistence of inflation levels started to rebound during the mid-2000s and then rose further during the Great Recession from December 2007 to June 2009. Moving beyond the Great Recession, the persistence of inflation levels drops sharply. The most recent data show a pickup in the persistence of inflation levels that started in mid-2019, nearly a year before the onset of the pandemic. Please note that a high persistence can be associated to both, a high inflation and a low inflation period. In other words, the high persistence before Covid explains why the Fed did not reach target, on average, for a protracted period of time. The persistence of inflation changes (red line) exhibits a pattern that is broadly similar to the persistence of inflation levels. But in the case of inflation changes, higher persistence now corresponds to a less negative correlation coefficient.
(Note: Lansing (2022) estimates that at the end of the data sample in March 2022, the shock volatility ratio is around 2, which means that persistent shocks to inflation are about twice as volatile as transitory shocks)
Switching to Eo et al. (2022), we report below the main results. The first figure shows the estimated sectoral trends (goods inflation trend, and services inflation trend). The second figure shows the variance decomposition of aggregate trend inflation.
Eo et al. (2022) results show that before the early-1990s, the estimated trend in each sector mimicked the actual sector-specific inflation. However, since the 1990s, while goods inflation has remained volatile, its trend has become quite flat. Accordingly, Eo et al. (2022) model interprets much of the fluctuation in goods inflation as transitory. In contrast the estimated trend in the services sector suggests that the opposite has happened with almost all variation in services inflation being attributed to its persistent (rather than transitory) component. For this reason, the variance of aggregate inflation (second figure) today is essentially driven by the services sectors.
Comment and implications for the Fed (staff)
The message from Lansing (2022) and Eo et al. (2022) is clear: the current inflationary shock seems persistent. On one hand, the strength of the monthly data suggests that the data should continue to come in on the strong side in the next few months/quarters (Lansing (2022)). On the other hand, the sectoral decomposition reinforces the message because the (possible) deceleration of goods inflation is expected to have little influence on aggregate trend inflation in the medium-term. Instead, the on-going rise in services trend inflation poses a challenge for the Fed because it requires aggressive monetary policy (see our note on John Roberts (2022) estimates of the terminal rate using FRB-US model).
In our view, the papers such as Lansing (2022) and Eo et al. (2022) do not influence directly the Fed staff forecast. However, in our view these papers are scrutinized by the staff. Taken together, Lansing (2022) and Eo et al. (2022) confirm the analysis from the three pillars of pi* (see our Pre-FOMC meeting package): underlying inflation is on the move and most likely is already above target (in our view, at least at 2¼ percent but probably close to 2½). As such, we do not expect the FOMC to pivot again: the risks are skewed to the upside and they are too big to twist back now.