Preamble: We are circulating this preview, given the upcoming FOMC. This is just to inform you about what the model says when run on today’s data. We are still working with the new dataset and things can bit a bit different in the end. But based on today’s information set, you can take the below as the most accurate signal. In this note, we show only the new baseline. After the FOMC, we will circulate an update, including stochastic simulations, scenarios, and a full explanation of what happened behind the scenes between the March FOMC and now.
In this note, we update the FRB-US baseline through 2024:Q1 and we show the new baseline. According to the model, the level of both actual output (in the forecast) and potential output (Y*) is higher than in the previous run, with no significant revisions to the output gap. As Powell said: “it’s a bigger economy but not a tighter one”. The model also revised up the path of the FF rate, driven by a higher path of core PCE price inflation. The FF rate is now expected at 5.1% in 2024:Q4, 4.4% in 2025:Q4, and 3.7% in 2026:Q4.
If the reader has questions, please direct them to our FRB-US specialist: Tilda Horvath (tilda.horvath@underlyinginflation.com). Tilda has programmed FRB-US at the Board and managed the model for almost 20 years. We remind the reader that we run ad-hoc scenarios using FRB-US free of charge. Do not be shy.
The new dataset
The Fed Board has posted a new FRB-US dataset (here). The dataset was created on April 2nd, therefore some variables were not updated through Q1. For this reason, we have updated the GDP components following the BEA release. Also, we have updated the bond yields (5y, 10y, and 30y) with historical data for Q1, and our nowcast for Q2. For core PCE price inflation and the unemployment rate, we are using our Q2 nowcast (3.2% QoQ saar, and 3.8%, respectively). Compared to previous rounds, we have found less “add factors” put by the Fed staff in the FRB-US database. This implies that matching the March SEP was easier than previously (in other words: the SEP forecast was already close to the new model forecast). Finally, we assume a R*=0.8% in anticipation to additional revisions in upcoming SEP (in any case, the results shown below are not sensitive to this choice, as we explain).
(For the record: to us, the Q1 GDP figure was not disappointing, as some commentators have described it. In fact, Final Sales to Private Domestic Purchasers (or “PDFP”), from which in our experience the Fed staff takes most signal from, came in at 3.1% QoQ saar. We also remind the reader that FRB-US back in January with basically no data for Q1 forecasted real GDP growth in Q1 at 2.5% QoQ saar (see here), correctly predicting a strong quarter, and beating consensus)
The new baseline
A higher path of the FF rate. Figure 1 shows the new baseline. As usual, the blue lines show the most recent SEP (March 2024 in this case), while the red lines show the model unconstrained (a.k.a. “inconsistent”) forecast. The overall message is that the model validates real GDP growth of the last SEP, and continues to expect a slowdown in the YoY in 2024:H2 (the new model forecast is 2.4% QoQ saar for 2024:Q2, 1.8% for Q3, and 2.0% for Q4). As for the FF rate, the model expects a more hawkish path than the latest SEP, driven by a more persistent core PCE price inflation process, which remains above target going forward (assuming R*=0.6% produces a path of the FF rate which is 0.1% lower than in Figure 1 at the end of the forecast horizon).
(The path for the 5y, 10y, 30y yield, and real expected return on equity can be seen here)
Figure 1. SEP forecast (blue line) and FRB-US forecast (red line)
Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed as YoY. Core inflation is core PCE price inflation. The blue lines show the latest SEP. The red lines show the “inconsistent FRB-US” forecast (the current baseline), that is the model-based forecast removing the “add-factors” put by the Fed staff to match the latest SEP, updated as specified in the text.
Implications for the FOMC
The model validates the March SEP in some dimensions, and signals upside risks around the path of the FF rate. For the first time in a long time, the SEP and FRB-US largely agree on the forecast for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate. FRB-US (as our “main” Phillips curve model) is a bit more pessimistic in terms of core PCE inflation dynamics. As a result, the path of the FF rate is less dovish than the SEP (“high for longer”). Overall, this is what we expect from Powell: the incoming data have roughly validated the March SEP, except for core PCE price inflation which was stronger than expected. As explained in previous notes (see here), the Fed can be patient and these data do not call for additional hikes. If any, for now, it’s “for longer”.