Not So Easy to Disinflate..
The September HICP report brought some good news but overall “the ducks are still not in a row”. The flash HICP report was a downward surprise (our note here). When the details are brought to the models, the results confirm what we wrote last month: net of noise and idiosyncratic shocks, core prices are growing at an annual rate of about 3%. We do expect some moderation going forward, but the point remains the same: it is very hard to see core HICP growing at 2% in the medium-term without additional help from the labor market. Therefore, at the moment we remain cautious about the September reading especially because the drop in transportation is unlikely to continue in coming months.
As for the ECB, the next Governing Council meeting is on autopilot (“for longer”). The medium-term forecast remains unfavorable and the risks around the ECB/NCBs staff forecast for 2024 are to the upside. Translated: there is still limited (if any) evidence that the EA can go back to 2%. For this reason, we expect the ECB to remain on hold. In this environment, we continue to expect the long-end of the yield curve to be under stress.
A PDF containing all relevant charts for the EA can be downloaded here. A PDF containing all relevant charts for the big 4 countries can be downloaded here.
Evidence from the distributions
The distribution: road to 2% still long. This month, we have no clear signal from the percentiles as some moved up, while other moved down (ridge plot here). The good news is that in the last 3 months (the black line in Figure 1) the distribution has shifted to the left compared to 6-9 months ago (the red line in Figure 1), and the median (Figure 2) has dropped notably compared to a year ago. However, there is limited progress compared to 3-6 months ago, as the black line in Figure 1 overlaps almost perfectly with the yellow line.
We are far from declaring victory, disinflating requires time. Right now, it seems we are centered around 3%.
Figure 1. Kernel of HICP excluding food and energy items changes (%, a.r.)
Figure 2. Median of HICP excluding food and energy items prices increase
Evidence from our CI-C model
Our CI-C model estimates that net of Covid and idiosyncratic shocks, the common component across items in September was in line with the previous months. Figure 3 shows the decomposition of the MoM of core HICP in the “common” component, the “idiosyncratic” component, and the “Covid” effect. The model estimates that in September the common component increased by 18bps, in line with the average of the previous months. The Covid effect is estimated at 4bps, and the idiosyncratic shock is positive (6bps). As we did in previous months, we consider as “true” core the one netting out the idiosyncratic part. Therefore, a rough estimate put the MoM (saar) of “true” core HICP at around 2.7% in September, below the previous three months. In this moment, the signals from the distributions, the CI-C model, and the “main” Phillips curve model (see below), they all point to a “true” core HICP inflation around 3% (which is the level we can expect the MoM saar to print going forward).
Figure 3. Contributions to MoM changes of HICP excluding food and energy items
Note: the Figure shows the decomposition of the MoM percent changes of HICP prices excluding food and energy items. The contributions are estimated using our CI-C model, a 2-stage OLS-LASSO regression model. The “Covid” effect is identified with price variations outside the 10th-90th percentiles of each item pre-Covid price change distribution.
Figure 4. Estimated “Common” component: YoY, 3m/3m a.r. and 6m/6m a.r.
Note: the Figure shows the 3m/3m at annual rate (green line), the 6m/6m at annual rate (red line), and the YoY (blue line) of the “common component” estimated using our CI-C model.
Implications for the medium-term forecast of core HICP
Medium-term model-based forecast is unchanged. Today’s data imply only cosmetic revisions to the medium-term model-based forecast. Using the unemployment rate as measure of “slack”, the forecast is at 4.8% (Q4/Q4) in 2023 (average of four quarters at 5.2%), 3.2% in 2024, 3.1% in 2025, and 3.1% in 2026. Using the output gap (right panel in Figure 5), the model delivers a more dovish forecast: 4.8% (Q4/Q4) in 2023, 3.1% in 2024, 2.4% in 2025, and 2.3% in 2026. The confidence bands (calculated from the estimated parameters distributions) suggest that the risks are still skewed to the upside.
Figure 5. Model-based medium-term forecast of core HICP (YoY)
Using Urate as a measure of “slack”
Using outputp gap as a measure of “slack”
Note: the confidence intervals (C.I.) are calculated using the estimated parameters distributions.
First quarter of forecast: 2023:Q4.
A comparison with the ECB/NCBs staff forecast
Risks around the ECB/NCBs forecasts are to the upside in 2024. Table 1 shows a comparison between our (updated) forecast and the new ECB/NCBs staff forecast. As discussed in previous updates, the 2023 ECB/NCBs staff forecast for core HICP is now close to our own. 2023 acquired inflation for core HICP is 4.9%/5.0%. Conditional on our 2023 forecast, the 2023 carryover in core HICP space for 2024 is 1.7%-1.8%, which means that the 2.9% of the ECB/NCBs staff forecast for 2024 is at risk of being revised up again, unless we have a significant slowdown or additional downward surprises in the incoming data.
(For a technical note on the concepts of “acquired inflation” and “carryover effect” see here and here).
Table 1. Comparison of forecasts
Note: the “UnderlyingInflation” forecast refers to the “main” model in Figure 5 (using the output gap as a measure of “slack”).
Implications for the ECB
Today’s release does not alter our view. The October Governing Council is on autopilot, and Lagarde will not have updated forecasts. Therefore, we continue to expect a “for longer” message. The September HICP was good news, but any discussion is postponed to December. Until then, the evidence points to “moderate” prints in core HICP (say 3-3.5% MoM saar). We do not expect to have evidence to conclude that the EA can go back to 2% any time soon. In this environment, we continue to expect the long-end of the yield curve to remain under stress, as discussed in private meetings.