On Hold.. for Now
Preamble. We are working under the following assumptions: (i) we use current crude oil futures prices (trading at around $95), and (ii) we assume that the ECB/NCB staff forecasts will not fully reflect the Iran war, as the cutoff date preceded the recent spike in oil prices.
In our view, the March Governing Council meeting itself is likely to be rather uneventful, as it will largely rely on outdated forecasts. Having said that, the scenarios are more interesting. According to our estimates, at current price levels oil can have a visible effect on headline HICP (the model-based forecast is revised up by roughly four-tenths in 2026), but the impact on core HICP remains very limited. Should oil prices rise by another $20, the models would add about one-tenth to the core inflation forecast and another three to four tenths to headline HICP.
We expect the tone of the Governing Council to be hawkish. This is necessary to anchor expectations and keep the door open to different scenarios. As for policy actions, our estimates suggest that at current oil price levels the ECB can still look through the shock*. However, should the war persist, oil (or natural gas) prices move materially higher, or inflation expectations begin to drift upward (ECB consumer median 3 and 5year), the ECB may eventually be forced to intervene.
*Reminder. This is what Isabel Schnabel wrote a few days ago: “In the near term, the recent spike in energy prices following the tensions in Iran makes the inflation path more uncertain. However, as long as deviations from our target – in either direction – remain temporary and small with well-anchored inflation expectations, they are of limited relevance for policy decisions, as they naturally occur when an economy is exposed to volatile energy prices. What matters for monetary policy is the medium-term outlook – that is, whether underlying price dynamics and wage developments are consistent with the target over the policy-relevant horizon. Judged on this basis, the lessons from the pandemic suggest that policymakers must tread carefully.”
As usual, we would be more than happy to schedule meeting with you to discuss the details. Please, do not be shy!
Main points:
The incoming data on core HICP have been roughly in line with (just a touch lower than) the latest ECB macroeconomic projections for core HICP. We estimate that core HICP prices are running at 2-2½ar. The distribution of price changes implies readings around target in the near-term, with only marginal implication from the war.
Figure 1. Evolution of cumulative unchained core HICP by year (index =1 on New Year’s Eve).
The main model medium-term forecast is revised up. The incoming data have been in line with the model own forecast, but higher oil prices are impacting the forecast. The forecast for core HICP is little changed, while the forecast of headline HICP is 4 tenths higher in 2026 and 2 tenths higher in 2027 and 2028.
The model forecast for core HICP is: 2.3% in 2026, 2.2% in 2027, and 2.2% in 2028.
The model forecasts for headline HICP are: 2.4% in 2026, 2.3% in 2027, and 2.0% in 2028.
Figure 2. Current vs previous GC round “main” model medium-term forecast of core HICP using the output gap.
Note: the figure shows the model forecast of core HICP (YoY) in the current round (left panel) and the previous GC round (right panel). The red shadowed areas show the intervals of confidence from the estimated parameters distributions.
Trend inflation models.The average of the models in Q1is 2.1 percent, unrevised to rounding compared to last round and the previous quarter. The estimate of “trend inflation” implies a core forecast around target in the medium-term.
Figure 3. Trend inflation models as in Rudd (2020) for the Euro area.
Note: the chart shows the estimated trend inflation from econometric models as in Rudd (2020). The models are split into three groups. The first group is a collection of Phillips-curve (PC) type of trend inflation models in which a measure of long-term inflation expectations is used as a proxy of trend inflation. The second group is a collection of state-space unobserved component models in which we have modelled trend inflation either as a smooth trend or as an augmented local level. Finally, the third group of models is a collection of Time Varying Parameters Vector AutoRegressive models (TVP-VAR) with different endogenous variables. This set of models follows the FEDS Note by Rudd (2020) “Underlying Inflation: Its Measurement and Significance”.
Path of the ECB deposit rate. The observed path of the ECB deposit rate is below all Taylor rules. All rules stay a bit above 2% going forward.
Figure 4. Taylor rules