ECI Compensation Growth: Model Update and An Analysis

Keep in mind

In this post we update our model-based ECI forecast and discuss its implications for the Fed. Our analysis shows that compensation growth is projected to be well above structural productivity and underlying inflation throughout the medium-term (2022-2024). Therefore, nominal compensation growth does not appear to be consistent with the Fed’s 2 percent target and might be more consistent with price inflation averaging 3 percent going forward. As such, nominal compensation growth is projected to remain a significant and underestimated upside risk around the Fed inflation forecast.

The facts

According to the BLS, over the three months ending in June, compensation costs for private industry workers increased 6.3 percent QoQ (at annual rate) and 5.5 percent YoY. Wages and salaries increased 5.7 percent for the 12-month period ending in June 2022, while the cost of benefits increased 5.3 percent.

Our model-based forecast

Based on the newly released Q2 figures, we have updated our model-based ECI forecast. (reminder: our ECI Phillips curve model mimics our “main” price Phillips curve model but allows for structural productivity). The Q2 incoming data have been a bit stronger than the model expected. Including the second quarter in the sample, the YoY change of ECI for private industry workers is now projected at 5¾ percent in 2022:Q4, 4¾ percent in 2023:Q4, and 4 percent in 2024:Q4. Compared to the forecast at the time of the July FOMC, the current forecast is ¾ of percentage point higher in 2022 and ¼ of percentage point higher at the end of the forecast horizon.

Figure 1. Phillips curve model-based ECI forecast

Note: the figure shows the ECI Phillips curve model-based forecast. The chart refers to the year-over-year percent changes of compensation costs for private industry workers. The confidence intervals are calculated with a quasi-out-of-sample exercise (stop the estimation at time «t» in the sample, calculate the forecast error at all horizons, and repeat for all «t»).

The Fed staff forecast

In our view and experience the Fed staff ECI forecast is informed by a model like the one presented above. However, at any point in time the Fed staff can deviate from the model because the Tealbook forecast is a judgmental projection. In the model, ECI growth is driven by three “fundamentals”: structural productivity, underlying inflation, and the contribution of slack defined as the unemployment gap. Below we show the ECI forecast that, in our view, the Fed staff has written in the July 2022 Tealbook and the decomposition (contributions) the staff has discussed with Powell and the Governors.

Figure 2. The ECI compensation Fed staff judgmental forecast and its contributions

Note: the figure shows our view of what the Fed staff has written in the July 2022 Tealbook for ECI (private industry workers) compensation growth. The black line shows the YoY percent change of ECI growth. “Other factors” refers to factors that cannot be otherwise attributed. “Slack” refers to the contribution of the unemployment gap. “Structural productivity” refers to the trend of labor productivity (output per hour, non-farm business sector) growth.

In our view, the Fed staff expects ECI growth to be about 5 percent in 2022 before stepping down to around 3½ percent in 2023 and 2024, in line with the estimated fundamentals. According to the Fed staff ECI decomposition, the contribution of underlying (business sector) inflation should remain a bit above 2 percent in 2022-2024. Structural productivity is expected to add about 1 percent per year in the medium-term. Slack (as captured by the contribution of the unemployment gap) is expected to add about 30-40bps this year but gradually fade as the unemployment rate converges back to the natural rate in 2024. Crucially, the “other factors” (that is, the quasi-residual of the decomposition) are expected to remain positive and large in 2022 after two years (2020 and 2021) in which they were also large and positive).

The crucial role of “other factors” (and why the Fed staff might be in trouble)

The ECI decomposition shows that it is hard to explain nominal compensation growth in 2020-2022 using the estimated fundamentals. Indeed, the model shows large and positive (quasi-)residuals in those years. In our view, this evidence has now become a big issue for the Fed staff because by being unable to explain nominal compensation growth, the staff is prone to large misses going forward.

Is the Fed staff decomposition correctly specified and what is the interaction between the estimated ECI model (Figure 1) and the decomposition (Figure 2)? What are the risks around the Fed forecast?

We answer these questions in the next paragraphs.

The estimated forecast vs the calibrated decomposition

The estimated ECI Phillips curve model (Figure 1) suggests that nominal compensation growth might remain elevated going forward. On the other hand, in our view, the Fed staff is assuming ECI growth to return in line with the estimated fundamentals next year (Figure 2). The contrast between the estimated model and the calibrated decomposition is a crucial point. In our experience, the Fed staff assumes that the calibrated model (the decomposition in Figure 2) is correctly specified. As such, the forecast assumes that the contribution of “other factors” is zero for the years after the current. However, this is very risky in the current environment. Indeed, the Fed staff has already made this mistake back in 2020 and again in 2021 for both, price and wage inflation. In both years, the Fed staff has assumed that the yellow bars in the decomposition (the “other factors”) had no persistency. Ex-post, it was a big mistake. Unfortunately, it seems that the Fed staff is making the same mistake again in 2022, ignoring for the 3rd consecutive year the signals of the estimated models. For this reason, the Fed staff ECI (and price) inflation forecast is prone to be revised up again next year (and the following), as it did in 2021 and 2022.

Can the model be mis-specified? And what are the implications for the (PCE) price inflation forecast?

As always, a model can be mis-specified. In the ECI case, the decomposition (as well as the estimated model) could assume a different measure of slack and/or assume a higher level of pi* (a higher structural productivity is unlikely, given the incoming data). In our simulations:

 

  • (i) Assuming a different measure of slack helps somewhat in 2021 and 2022 but leaves in any case a large residual in the decomposition in those years.
  • (ii) Assuming a higher pi* helps in each year but puts upper pressure on the Fed forecast in 2023 and 2024 and results in an even higher forecast of the estimated model in those years.

 

The implications for the Fed staff and the FOMC are not marginal. We let the discussion of (i) to a different post and we concentrate on (ii). As mentioned, assuming a higher pi* does help in explaining higher compensation growth in 2020-2022 but it implies a level of pi* significantly higher (2¾ percent, at least). Considering the usual gap between business sector inflation and consumer price inflation, assuming a higher pi* in the ECI decomposition implies pi* at 3% (or higher) in the core PCE price decomposition. In other words, because of the general equilibrium component of the economy, the behavior of ECI compensation growth implies that underlying inflation in core PCE space is (at least) 3 percent, that is much higher than the Fed staff is assuming. Not only, but because pi* is persistent by construction, the evidence points to upside risks around the Fed staff (and FOMC) inflation forecast in 2023 and 2024.

Conclusion

Our analysis has shown that compensation growth is above structural productivity and underlying inflation throughout the entire medium-term (2022-2024). Assuming a higher pi* alleviates the tension in the forecast but results in a price (PCE) inflation forecast significantly above the Fed staff (and the FOMC) in the medium-term. As such, nominal compensation growth is projected to remain a significant and underestimated upside risk around the Fed inflation forecast.

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