Given the ongoing energy shock, many observers believe that the ECB may already be considering raising interest rates. We disagree. To explain why, we use the same Macro 101 framework that in 2022 led us to correctly anticipate the inflation dynamics in the euro area.
The TL;DR version of the story is the following: the crucial difference relative to 2022 is not only that the shock today is (so far) smaller, but above all that we are not facing a positive demand shock. For this reason, the most likely outcome is a visible impact on headline inflation, some slowdown in growth, and only a modest effect on core inflation. As a result, we expect the ECB to look through this shock and refrain from reacting. Of course, we stand ready to revise this assessment if: (i) natural gas prices were to rise much further; and (ii) governments were to respond with sizeable fiscal stimulus packages in support of the economy.
Our 2022 call
Back in 2022, our analysis of euro area inflation dynamics was well outside the consensus. At the time, we argued that the demand side was playing an important role. For this reason, we expected continued rate hikes and maintained that the ECB staff was underestimating the persistence of inflation—an assessment that also differed from the prevailing market view and that of many analysts.
A list of our 2022/2023 notes:
- December 2022 note arguing that EA inflation was not (only) “supply driven – here.
- December 2022 slides – here.
- Ascari et al. (2023) paper (Riccardo is a coauthor of this paper) estimating the contributions of the EA finaltion dynamics – here.
- March 2023 note to reinforce the message “it is not only about energy prices” – here.
- March 2023 note to explain why the ECB/NCBs staff forecast was completely implausible – here.
- March 2023 note to estimate via local projections the passthrough of natural gas prices on EA core HICP and the pace of EA disinflation – here.
Why (so far) the current shock is different
The intuition is straightforward within a Macro 101 framework. In 2022, the energy shock generated a negative supply shock. Governments responded with massive fiscal stimulus—Italy alone, for example, implemented an energy support package amounting to roughly 4-5 percentage points of GDP—which kept demand highly accommodative and effectively produced a positive demand shock.
In an inflation (pi)–output (Q) diagram (see Figure 1 below), the economy therefore moved from a point such as E” to a point like E”’, with significantly higher inflation but without a recession. In fact, the expansion continued vigorously in several countries. (Note: the slide below is taken from our 2022 presentation; the reader can find the link to the slides above.) Some papers even estimated that the euro area output gap during those years reached +4 to +6 percentage points—an indication of how large the fiscal stimulus was.
The current situation is therefore quite different. While there is indeed a meaningful energy shock, (i) its magnitude is still not comparable to that of 2022, particularly with respect to natural gas, and (ii) there is currently no comparable demand shock. For this reason, the most likely outcome is that the economy moves from a point like E” to a point such as E””, with a mildly negative output gap, higher headline inflation, but only a modest increase in core inflation.
Figure 1. Macro101 demand-supply shock
The passthrough from energy to HICP inflation
The empirical literature finds that energy price shocks transmit to euro area inflation through both direct and indirect channels, with significantly larger effects on headline inflation than on core inflation. The direct pass-through to headline HICP is sizable and relatively rapid due to the weight of energy in the consumption basket. For example, Alessandri, Gazzani and Rachedi (2024) estimate that a 10% increase in natural gas prices raises headline inflation by about 0.4 percentage points on impact. By contrast, the pass-through to core inflation is smaller and more gradual. Conflitti and Luciani (2019) show that oil price shocks affect euro area core inflation mainly through the common macroeconomic component, implying a small but statistically significant and persistent effect. More recent evidence suggests that the indirect transmission through production costs and wages strengthened during the 2021–22 energy crisis, with energy shocks explaining a substantial share of the surge in both headline and, to a lesser extent, core inflation (e.g. Neri et al., 2023). Overall, the literature points to large and immediate effects on headline inflation and smaller, delayed spillovers to core inflation.
Our estimate. Since the literature typically estimates the impulse response function (IRF) as the response to a percentage change in oil prices—a formulation that is neither very intuitive nor particularly practical—we instead estimate the IRF of energy and headline inflation to a $10 increase in Brent crude prices. Figure 2 reports our results. When oil prices rise by $10 and remain at that level, headline inflation increases by roughly 20–25 basis points, while the impact on the energy component is naturally about ten times larger. In the current situation, oil prices have increased by roughly $40 per barrel. This implies a peak impact on headline inflation of around 80–100 basis points, which would translate into an increase of approximately 60–70 basis points of the average YoY in 2026.
By contrast, the impact on core inflation (not shown) is significantly smaller, reaching at most 0.1–0.2 percentage points at the peak.
Figure 2. IRF of energy and headline HICP to a 10$ move in oil prices
Conclusion
The ECB and its staff are well aware of the effects of an energy shock on both headline and core inflation. There is therefore little doubt that, if Brent prices were to remain at current levels, headline inflation could move back close to 3 percent, with core inflation remaining above target.
However, the current shock is (so far) quite different from that of 2022. This is true both because natural gas prices are nowhere near the peak reached in 2022 and—crucially—because there has been no fiscal policy response.
For this reason, we continue to believe that the ECB has little appetite, at least in the near term, to discuss raising interest rates. In this environment, a wait-and-see approach—looking through the shock—remains the most likely course of action.