Half Capitulation. The outcome of the December FOMC looks like a (half) capitulation to us. The new SEP is quite close to the latest FRB run. The only difference is that the dots are marginally more hawkish in 2025 for the FF rate. But overall, now the SEP had to accept reality after making a mistake back in September: we are still facing a solid/strong economy with no certainty to reach the 2% inflation target in the medium-term, especially for core CPI. The FOMC raised significantly the 2025 core PCE forecast (from 2.2% to 2.5%), an unusual move at this time of the year for the next. To our eyes, given the signals of our models, this looks like a (half) capitulation or an implicit message that the FOMC can live with core PCE a bit above target (forget what Powell says, he will never admit it in case). The second half of this story -core PCE not going back to target in 2026 and 2027- remains to be seen in the coming quarters/years.
Statement
Slower pace. The new statement is almost identical to the previous one. The only difference is that the new statement hints at a slower pace of cuts by adding the phrase “the extent and timing” to modify potential adjustments.
The dots
Models were right… Figure 1 shows a comparison between the September SEP (solid blue line), the FRB-US model pre-FOMC run (dashed red line), and the new December SEP (blue dots). The new dots are very close to the FRB-US prediction, especially for the FF rate. The FOMC now projects core PCE price inflation at 2.5% in 2025, in line with FRB-US and our “main” Phillips curve model. Real GDP growth is expected to remain a bit above potential, and the unemployment rate is projected to go sideways. Overall, the message of the new dots is in line with what FRB-US has been suggesting for several quarters: the US economy is expected to remain solid, the unemployment rate does not increase and there is a chance that core PCE price inflation might remain above target going forward.
Figure 1. Comparison between the September SEP (blue solid line), pre-FOMC FRB-US model run (red dashed line), and the December SEP (blue dots).
Q&As
Question: What happened that made you revising up the upside risks to inflation? Was Nov 5th?
Powell. “What happened is that our forecast for inflation for this year, I think, are five tenths higher than they were in September. So, you had two months of higher inflation in September, October, as I mentioned, November is back on track. But you know, once again, we’ve had a year-end projection for inflation, and it’s kind of fallen apart as we approach the end of the year. So, that is certainly a large factor in people’s thinking. I can tell you that might be the single biggest factor is inflation has once again underperformed relative to expectations. It’s still going to be between two and a half and three. It’s way below where it was. But you know, we really want to see progress on inflation […].”.
Comment: We are very confused by Powell’s answer (we listened to his words 7 times to check), as the FOMC forecast is certainly not 5 tenths higher than it was in September. In fact, the core PCE price inflation forecast for 2024 has been pretty stable this year (2.6% in the March SEP, 2.8% in the June SEP, 2.6% in the September SEP, and 2.8% today). To us, the reason is different: the FOMC has not followed the models and paid a price. Take a random forecast we made in October 2023 after the 2023 September CPI report (our note is here): the “main” model projected core PCE price inflation to 2.7% (Q4/Q4) in 2024, 2.6% in 2025, and 2.5% in 2026. Now we have come to a point in which it is hard to ignore the models, at least the 2025 signal. Consequently, the FOMC raised the forecast. In a nutshell: half capitulation. The other half capitulation (inflation to remain above target in 2026 and 2027) to be seen in the coming quarters/years.
Question: Powell got a couple of questions about tariffs and how the Fed could respond.
Powell gave very generic answers pointing to the 2018 September Tealbook (link) which contains simulations for tariffs scenarios. He did not add much more, he took time and will likely reassess any implication only after the announcement (if any).
For the record: the inflation analyst on-round at the Board at the September 2018 meeting was.. Riccardo Trezzi (the reader can see a memo sent by Luciani and Trezzi to the FOMC here). Also, in case the reader has missed it, we have recently circulated some FRB simulations on tariffs (here).
Question: Are you confident that (core) inflation will come down?
Powell. “I would say I am confident that inflation has come down a great deal. And I’m confident in the story about why it has come down […]. And I’ll tell you why.”.
[Powell here went into the details of the usual three pieces of core inflation: housing, non-housing services, and core goods. We skip for brevity, as we are all familiar with the facts].
“So, the overall picture, the story of why inflation should be coming down, is still intact. In particular, the labor market. Look at the labor market. It’s cooler by so many measures, now modestly cooler than it was in 2019.”
Comment: Yes and no. Yes, inflation has come down. No, there is not much evidence it can converge back to 2% (especially in CPI space). Indeed, if everything has normalized (or even cooler than it was in 2019), how come real GDP growth is way above potential this year and it is projected (by the FOMC) to remain above potential also next year? Would it be so surprising if inflation remains above target for another year or more?