April 2023 CPI: Distributions and Models Update

A Step in the Right Direction (And a Question Mark)

Evidence from the distributions

Distribution implies (core) inflation is very persistent. This month (like the previous), there is no clear signal from the percentiles (not shown) as some moved up but other moved down. While the impression by looking at some exclusion indexes is that there is real hope for H2, the distribution (Figure 1) continues to show virtually no progresses and remains radically different than pre-Covid. We expect core CPI in June-July to be weaker than in April (0.3% vs 0.5%). But the issue remains the same: if the distribution will not shift back to where it was, it is virtually impossible to get a reading consistent with the 2% target. Translated: some good news but we need much more.

Figure 1. Kernel of CPI excluding food and energy items changes (MoM %, a.r.)

Note: the Figure shows the fitted Kernel (Epanechnikov) distribution of MoM percent changes at annual rate of CPI prices excluding food and energy items.

Figure 2.  Median (core) CPI metrics

Note: the Figure shows the median (MoM %, a.r.) of the distribution of CPI prices changes excluding food and energy items (left panel) and the YoY (right panel).

Evidence from our CI-C model

Our CI-C model estimates that net of Covid and idiosyncratic shocks, the strength of the data in April was a bit lower than in recent months. Figure 3 shows the decomposition of the MoM of core CPI in the “common” component, the “idiosyncratic” component, and the “Covid” effect.  The model estimates that in April the common component increased by 20bps, lower than in March. The Covid effect is estimated at 8bps (also lower than in recent months), and the idiosyncratic shock is large and positive (13bps). The estimated large idiosyncratic shock squares well with the narrative of used car prices. 

The behavior of the common component in recent months (Figure 4) confirms that disinflation is not so easy and that going back to the 2% target will take time. A straight-read of the model estimates implies that the “true” inflation (that is net of idiosyncratic shocks) is around 4% at annual rate in April. 

Figure 3. Contributions to MoM changes of CPI excluding food and energy items (CI-C model)

Note: the Figure shows the decomposition of the MoM percent changes of CPI prices excluding food and energy items. The contributions are estimated using our CI-C model, a 2-stage OLS-LASSO regression model. The “Covid” effect is identified with price variations outside the 10th-90th percentiles of each item pre-Covid price change distribution.

Figure 4. Estimated “Common” component: YoY, 3m/3m a.r. and 6m/6m a.r.

Note: the Figure shows the 3m/3m at annual rate (green line), the 6m/6m at annual rate (red line), and the YoY (blue line) of the “common component” estimated using our CI-C model.

Implications for the medium-term forecast of core PCE price inflation

The medium-term forecast of core PCE is lower (with a caveat). Updating our “main” medium-term model for core PCE price inflation has not been an easy task this time. The reason is that the inclusion of Q2 in sample (our nowcast: 4.6% ar) triggered a large upside revision and the forecast remained around 4% at the end of the horizon. Because at this point the model is likely to be biased upwardly by technical factors*, we have included in-sample also our forecast for Q3 (3.5% ar), as a way to provide more guidance to the model. The resulting forecast is shown in Figure 5. The “main” model forecast is: 4.25% in 2023, 3.6% in 2024, and 3.2% in 2025. This forecast is about 2-3 tenths lower than at the time of the May FOMC meeting and remains above the Fed target at the end of the medium-term

*Please, get in contact if interested in the details. The intuition is simple: the number of lags of the dependent variable in the model can have an influence on the results, depending on recent history. Because the model contains 6 lags of the dependent variable and because the last 6 quarters have been very strong, the model estimates that core PCE will remain much higher for much longer. However, if the model is also allowed to see Q3 (again, our forecast pretending that it is real data), it delivers a much more reasonable forecast. For this reason, we have decided to show this forecast in Figure 5.

Figure 5. “Main” Phillips curve model forecast, core PCE price inflation (YoY, %).

Note: the figure shows the latest run of our “main” Phillips curve model. The confidence intervals (C.I.) are estimated using quasi-out-of-sample methods (estimate the model over a sub-sample, forecast, and calculate the root mean squared forecast errors). First quarter of forecast: 2023:Q4.

Implications for the Fed Board staff

March SEP is still a good baseline for the FF rate. In the latest SEP, the FOMC expected core PCE price inflation at 3.6% in 2023. The March and April CPI reports (received since then) are roughly consistent with that forecast. Therefore, we suspect that the Fed staff and the FOMC have no reason right now to deviate from that baseline in which the FF rate remains above 5% for the rest of the year. As mentioned, we do expect another very solid reading in core CPI space in May, followed by a couple of possibly softer prints. But the question “is (or when is) the US economy going back to 2%?” remains unanswered. Moderation to come, but until the probability of hitting target (in core space) will be higher than now, we remain skeptical the Fed will turn dovish. For the time being (that is, at least until September), the Fed can just wait and see.

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