If you want to understand and anticipate the Fed… use their models. The FOMC has finally recognized that: (i) inflation is way more persistent that previously understood, (ii) FF rate needs to reach 4% to disinflate this economy, (iii) even by doing so core inflation remains above target in 2024, (iv) slowing down the economy and raising the unemployment rate (risking a recession) is almost inevitable. As discussed in private meetings, these are the predictions that FRB-US model and our “main” Phillips curve model have been delivering for months. The SEP is now very close to the models’ predictions, although some upside risks (for inflation) remain in 2023 and 2024.
Statement
Please, see below the relevant changes in the statement about inflation.
Comment: finally, the FOMC is recognizing that, conditional on today’s information set, it is hard to see core PCE price inflation returning to target in 2024. Nevertheless, the committee is determined: whatever it takes to restore price stability and its credibility.
New SEP
SEP: In the new SEP, output growth is below potential in 2022 and 2023 and marginally higher in 2024. Consequently, the unemployment rate increases from 3.7% this year to 4.1% in 2024. At the same time, core inflation is expected at 4.3% in 2022, 2.7% in 2023, and 2.3% in 2024.
Comment: the new SEP is closer to our “main” Phillips curve model and the FRB-US model-based forecasts (source: John Roberts’ simulations) than we were expecting. As discussed in private meetings (see below a slide from our pre FOMC meeting), the models are suggesting that the inflation process is persistent and that a significant slowdown in economic activity is necessary to achieve price stability. Even conditional on the FF rate at 3.8% and the unemployment rate at 4.1% in 2024, the SEP forecast for core PCE price inflation does not converge back to target in 2024, consistent with the FRB-US (and Fed staff Phillips curve-based model) prediction. Put it differently, the FOMC has recognized that inflation is too high and the Fed needs to do something about it. But according to their own models, reaching target (2%) at the end of 2024 would require pushing the FF rate above 4%. The issue is that by doing so, the FOMC would deliberately engineer a recession. Therefore, while sending a signal, the FOMC has postponed any additional decision depending on how strong the trade-off will be. The models continue to suggest that the risks around the SEP (inflation) forecast are to the upside for 2023 and 2024.
Q&As
Inflation expectations: did you see anything in the data that can put your credibility at risk?
Powell: “We look at a broad range of inflation expectations. You have surveys, surveys of the public, measures market-based. When you look across that broad range of data, you see expectations are still in place where short-term inflation will be high, but it comes down sharply over the next couple of years. […] It is really important to us that remains the case. […] If we even see a couple of indicators that bring that into question, we take that very seriously. We’ll take this for granted. We take it very seriously. The Michigan reading was quite eye-catching […]. So, we are watching that and thinking, this is something we need to take seriously. One of the factors in deciding to move ahead with 75bps today is what we saw in inflation expectations. We are determined to keep them anchored at 2%”
Comment: on May 14th, we circulated an update (Fed CIE nowcast) titled “Fed losing the war, not the battle”. We are not surprised by Powell’s words. There are clear signs that inflation expectations are de-anchoring, which is an existential threat for the Fed. Good news is that the FOMC is well aware of the issue and stands ready to fight back. But everything else on the expectations front has been really alarming recently.
What do you need to see (as inflation development) to meet your criteria? What is the trade-off with the unemployment rate?
Powell: “We want to see declining monthly readings for inflation. We like to see inflation headed down. But right now, policy rate is well below neutral. Soon enough, the policy rate will be up where we think it should be. Then the question is, do you slow down? You will make this decision about whether it is appropriate to slowdown from 50 to 25, or speed up. Ultimately, we will not declare victory until we really see convincing, compelling evidence that inflation is coming down. That is, what it would take for us to say, ok we think that this job is done. Because frankly we saw it last year. Inflation came down over the course of the summer and then turned around and came back up. I think we will be careful in declaring victory.”
Comment: in our view, going forward will be tricky. The distribution of price changes has shifted and it is now centered around 4%-ish (in core CPI space). For this reason, the “compelling” evidence can come only from a left shift of the distribution (which will probably take several months) and not from a monthly lucky draw. In the meanwhile, we will continue with our usual procedure: turn down the volume of bottom-up sectoral stories and pay attention only to stats.
Is an increase in the unemployment rate necessary to control inflation?
Powell: “I would characterize that [as a good outcome, ndr], if you were to get inflation down to 2% and the unemployment rate went to 4.1%. […] A 4.1% unemployment with inflation well on its way to 2% would be a successful outcome. We are not looking to have a higher unemployment rate. But I would look at that as a successful outcome. We don’t seek to put people out of work. We never think too many people are working. People need to have jobs. But we also think that you really cannot have the kind of labor market we want without price stability.” (Powell also stressed that part of the inflation process -the one related to supply chain issues- is probably outside the control of the Fed and that there is uncertainty about the timing and magnitude of the relief coming from lower demand on a vertical supply curve)
Comment: once again, please refer to FRB-US forecast. Is an increase in the unemployment rate necessary to control inflation? Short answer is “yes”, and Powell has acknowledged it. Will the Fed be able to deliver the gentle rise in the unemployment rate consistent with a gentle disinflation? Nobody knows. But right now it is the only path forward for the Fed considering that it remains unclear if, when, and to what extent supply chains issues will be solved.
Are you targeting core or headline inflation?
Powell: “We are responsible for “inflation” in the law. And inflation means headline inflation. So that’s our ultimate goal. We, of course, like all central banks look very very carefully at core inflation because it’s a much better predictor of where inflation is going and it’s also more relevant to our tools. […] But the current situation is particularly difficult because of what I mentioned about expectations. We cannot set.. really.. energy prices are set by global commodity prices. And most of food, not all of it but most food prices are heavily influence by global commodity prices too. […] but we have to be mindful of the potential effect on inflation expectations from headline. So it’s a very difficult situation to be in.”
Comment: perfect explanation from Powell. We only add one thing. In principle, consumers’ long-term inflation expectations should not be affected by short-term movements in food and energy prices. However, in reality they are (according to the literature and common sense, they are “salient” prices). Given the violent shocks to food and energy prices (and the cross-sectional dispersion across respondents), until last Friday the puzzle was why consumers’ long-term expectations were still at 3.0% in Michigan. The Fed implicitly targets core inflation for technical reasons (and rightly so). But in this environment it must pay a lot of attention to food and energy prices too, given the feedback through expectations.
Do you think inflation data is a good indicator or is it lagging indicator? Do you think it’s better to overshoot in controlling inflation rather than undershoot?
Powell: “There’s always a risk of going too far or going not far enough. It’s going to be a difficult judgement to make, or maybe not, maybe it will be quite clear. And we are quite mindful of the dangers. But I would say the worst mistake we can make would be to fail, it’s not an option, you know we have to restore price stability. We really do.”
Comment: in our view the takeaway is clear. The FOMC is ultra-committed, it must be. They will not stop, they cannot stop, until they are sure the inflation beast is under control. If in doubt, they will overshoot.
Sticky prices – How persistent do you think inflation process is?
Powell: “Inflation started off in pandemic-related areas and it spread broadly across the economy into the services sector, it was really in the goods sector at the beginning. Particularly you are seeing in travelling right now. […] Shelter inflation is high. It’s a time when we are not seeing progress and we want to see progress.”
Comment: the entire distribution has shifted… we are not surprised!