Following the latest BEA releases, we have updated our FRB US baseline, with the results presented in Figure 1. We currently assume real GDP growth of around 2.7% in the fourth quarter of 2026 and core PCE inflation of 3.3% Q4/Q4. The new baseline remains broadly similar to the previous one. The main difference is that, with economic activity somewhat stronger than previously anticipated, the implied federal funds rate path is now more hawkish than the September SEP. The policy rate is slightly above the SEP path in 2026, and the model implies at least one additional hike beyond the one already projected for 2026, most likely in the first quarter of 2027. Thereafter, the Fed could remain on hold for an extended period, effectively adopting a higher for longer stance. Importantly, however, the model still does not project inflation returning to 2%, even by the end of 2029.
Several of you have pointed out that the Fed’s reaction function is characterized by considerable inertia, something once again evident at the October FOMC meeting. This raises an interesting question. What would happen if the Fed were somewhat less inertial, and how much higher could the federal funds rate rise? We have already circulated several scenarios addressing this question, concluding that, under realistic assumptions, the federal funds rate could reach approximately 4.8%, but would be unlikely to move significantly higher unless the Fed explicitly sought to bring inflation back to target by 2027, requiring substantially more aggressive tightening.
In this new exercise, presented in Figure 2, we reduce the inertia coefficient in the policy rule to 0.7, with the simulation starting in the fourth quarter of 2026 (similar results by starting in Q1:2027). Under this specification, the model implies approximately 40 additional basis points of tightening. We would not interpret this as a literal forecast, particularly because we do not expect a 50 basis point hike in December. Nevertheless, the exercise illustrates how a less inertial reaction function could generate a more aggressive policy response in this environment. Economic growth would be somewhat weaker under this scenario, although the additional tightening would still be insufficient to bring inflation back to target. The results therefore highlight the sensitivity of the implied policy path to the degree of inertia embedded in the Fed’s reaction function.
Under reasonable assumptions, however, we continue to expect the Fed to maintain a relatively inertial approach. Historically, the Committee has departed materially from this behavior mainly during recessions or episodes of exceptionally elevated inflation, such as in 2022, neither of which describes the current environment. Nevertheless, the risks to the policy rate remain tilted to the upside. Across our simulations, a federal funds rate of around 4.5% appears increasingly plausible, with the possibility of approaching 5% under less favorable conditions.
Finally, one conclusion remains particularly relevant for the yield curve. It is difficult to reconcile the interest rate path currently priced by markets for 2028, and especially 2029, with the FRB US model. Across almost all our scenarios, the implied federal funds rate at those horizons remains below current market pricing.
Figure 1. The New Baseline 
Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis. Core inflation refers to core PCE price inflation. The blue lines and bands represent the latest SEP projections, while the red lines depict the model baseline.
Figure 2. Scenario – Less inertial Fed

Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis. Core inflation refers to core PCE price inflation. The blue lines and bands represent the latest SEP projections, the red lines depict the model baseline, while the gray lines are the constructed scenario.