At the end of this forecasting round, the most likely outcome of the October FOMC meeting appears to be that the Committee will leave interest rates unchanged. From our perspective, however, we disagree with this policy choice, as we believe that the inflation outlook is gradually deteriorating and risks becoming increasingly difficult for the Fed to control (seriously, 34-37bp MoM of core PCE and the Fed does not hike?).
Consider that our latest forecast puts core PCE inflation at 3.4% by December 2026, implying that, without the recent BEA revisions, inflation would have been close to 4%, a genuinely alarming level. After five years of elevated inflation, any attempt to downplay the signals emerging from the data seems increasingly difficult to justify. In our view, the FOMC’s reluctance to act largely reflects the considerable inertia embedded in its policy reaction function, as well as continuing mistakes of the Fed staff (which is still leaving pi* at 2%, according to the minutes).
At the same time, the FRB US model, which has proved remarkably reliable throughout this cycle, continues to imply a federal funds rate path almost identical to the September SEP (at least conditional on an inertial Taylor rule). From this perspective, we see little reason to expect the FOMC to feel significant pressure to deviate from its current policy path in the near term.
Nevertheless, we remain highly skeptical that the monetary policy stance outlined in the September SEP will be sufficient to bring inflation back to target, rather than allowing it to remain persistently above 2%. Our models continue to suggest that the Fed will eventually need to reconsider its approach, raising the federal funds rate to at least 4.5%, and potentially close to 5%, and maintaining that restrictive stance for at least a year (or two) to achieve a sustained disinflation of the U.S. economy.
Under these circumstances, we expect the Chair to deliver a distinctly hawkish message. Any dovish communication would, in our view, be inappropriate and entirely unwarranted given the current inflation outlook.
Main points
Recent data have been stronger than the Fed staff forecast implied by the latest FOMC minutes. There is no evidence of deceleration in core PCE inflation, whose trajectory remains close to its historical 75th percentile. There is no improvement in the distributions (not shown – see our slides)
Figure 1. Core PCE – SA YtD

Near-term forecast. Our bottom-up forecast projects the YoY of core core PCE at 3.4%, and headline PCE at 3.8% in December 2026. This near-term forecast is a bit stronger than last round.
Figure 2. Our bottom-up YoY PCE forecast.

Trend-inflation. The trend-inflation models suggest that the persistent component is running around 2½%-3%; pi* remains higher than target and higher than the assumption of the Fed staff.
Figure 3. Evolution of trend inflation.

Model-based medium-term forecast. The core PCE forecast model-based is very close to the latest SEP. As for headline PCE, the model forecast is close to the SEP in 2026 and a bit below it going forward.

Figure 4. “Main” model PCE price inflation forecasts.
Headline PCE

Core PCE

FRB-US. The federal funds rate path implied by FRB US is currently identical to the latest SEP projections. The same applies to the unemployment rate, while the real GDP growth projections are also very similar. The main discrepancy remains core PCE inflation, which the model continues to project above the Fed’s 2% target at the end of the medium term forecast horizon.
Figure 5. FRB-US model forecast
