Over the past week, we have discussed a number of scenarios with several of you, and there appears to be a growing consensus that the front end of the yield curve might have moved too far, suggesting that the two year Treasury yield could decline at least a bit, over the coming days or weeks. In this short note, we show that the FRB US model appears to support this view.
We recently circulated another note, “The 2% Consistent Terminal Rate“, in which we showed that, if the Federal Reserve wanted to ensure that inflation returned to its 2% target by 2029, the federal funds rate would need to reach approximately 4.8% (our note is here – please remember that the model has re-estimated a lower terminal rate post BEA revision). In this note, we consider two alternative scenarios. The first assumes that real GDP growth remains above potential in 2027, at around 2.5%. Under these conditions, the Fed would maintain a higher for longer policy stance, with the federal funds rate reaching approximately 4.1% and remaining broadly unchanged through 2028 and 2029. This reflects an unemployment rate persistently below 4% and core inflation remaining above target. The results are shown in Figure 1. In Figure 2, we go one step further and simulate an even stronger growth scenario, in which the unemployment rate declines to 3.8% in both 2027 and 2028. Under these assumptions, the model implies an additional rate hike, with the terminal rate around 4.4% and core PCE inflation remaining close to 2.5%.
What could go wrong with this assessment? The main risk is that the Fed decides to pursue a substantially more aggressive disinflation strategy. Time has generally been on the side of central banks, but if the Fed wanted to accelerate the disinflation process and bring core PCE inflation all the way back to 2%, rather than accepting inflation a few tenths above target by the end of 2028, the required terminal rate would be considerably higher. Indeed, our simulations, reported in Figure 3, suggest that the federal funds rate would need to rise above 6%. We nevertheless consider this scenario relatively unlikely, given the substantial costs it would impose on the labour market. If the Fed managed to bring core PCE inflation down to around 2.5%, or even slightly below, we doubt that the Committee would be willing to embark on such an aggressive and restrictive monetary policy path simply to accelerate the final stage of disinflation.
Putting everything together, the view we have discussed with several of you, and which appears to be gaining traction in the market, namely that the front end of the yield curve has moved a little bit too far, seems broadly supported by the FRB US model, as the 2y yield is currently trading at the top of the plausible ranges.
Figure 1. Stronger 2027 real GDP growth scenario. SEP forecast (blue lines and bands), FRB-US baseline (red lines), and FRB-US scenario (gray lines).

Figure 2. 3.8% Urate scenario. SEP forecast (blue lines and bands), FRB-US baseline (red lines), and FRB-US scenario (gray lines).

Figure 3. Faster disinflation scenario. SEP forecast (blue lines and bands), FRB-US baseline (red lines), and FRB-US scenario (gray lines).

Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis. Core inflation refers to core PCE price inflation. The blue lines and bands represent the latest SEP projections, the red lines depict the current model baseline, and the gray lines the constructed scenario.
We remind readers that all the details of our FRB run are available on our website, where they can also construct their own simulated scenarios by introducing shocks through our “Build Your Scenario” tool. If the reader has questions, please direct them to our FRB-US specialist: Tilda Horvath (tilda.horvath@underlyinginflation.com). Tilda has programmed FRB-US at the Board and managed the model for almost 20 years. We remind the reader that we run ad-hoc scenarios using FRB-US free of charge. Do not be shy.