The new FRB-US baseline is more dovish.
If the reader has questions, please direct them to our FRB-US specialist: Tilda Horvath (tilda.horvath@underlyinginflation.com). Tilda has programmed FRB-US at the Board and managed the model for almost 20 years. We remind the reader that we run ad-hoc scenarios using FRB-US free of charge. Do not be shy.
New Assumptions
We have revised the baseline under the following assumptions: real GDP growth of 3.0% QoQ SAAR in Q3, an average unemployment rate of 4.1% in Q3, and core PCE inflation of 2.3% QoQ SAAR in Q3. In addition, we have updated oil prices and U.S. Treasury yields to reflect current market pricing. Finally, we have included the recent BEA revisions for core PCE.
The New Baseline
Figure 1 presents the revised baseline (red lines) alongside the most recent SEP projections (blue lines and bands).
The results are very clear in terms of growth and the unemployment rate. The model is broadly aligned with the SEP. Real GDP growth is slightly higher in 2026 and slightly lower in 2027 and 2028, but the differences are quite small. Consistent with this, the unemployment rate follows an essentially flat path in both the model and the SEP, remaining around 4.1%. The more significant development concerns core PCE inflation. Following the BEA revisions, the inflation path is considerably more dovish than in previous runs. The model starts from 3.1% in 2026 and continues to project inflation above target thereafter, although it is now closer to target by the end of 2029 than in previous runs.
Most importantly, as we had already shown in previous simulations, the implied path for the federal funds rate is now below the SEP path. This does not surprise us, as it is precisely the risk we have repeatedly highlighted in previous analyses, namely that the BEA revisions could ultimately generate a materially more dovish policy path in the models. This also helps explain the relatively abrupt shift in tone from some FOMC members. At this point, we believe the burden of proof for any additional rate hike this year, including in December, has shifted decisively to the incoming data. Some upside surprises would probably be required to justify further tightening.
Figure 1. SEP forecast (blue lines and bands) and FRB-US forecast (red lines)

Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed on a year-over-year basis. Core inflation refers to core PCE price inflation. The blue lines and bands represent the latest SEP projections, while the red lines depict the “inconsistent FRB-US” forecast—i.e., the model-based baseline without the Fed staff’s add-factors used to align with the latest SEP. This forecast has been updated as outlined in the text.
We remind readers that all the details of our FRB run are available on our website, where they can also construct their own simulated scenarios by introducing shocks through our “Build Your Scenario” tool.