It was great seeing so many of you in London this week. We had an excellent set of meetings and discussions, and we are grateful for the time and insights shared by all participants.
Below, we summarize the main themes and views that emerged across clients during our conversations. The report is organized by region and attempts to reflect both the consensus positions and the areas where views were more divided.
United States
The dominant impression from meetings on the U.S. economy was one of resilience. Most participants continue to believe that the economy is growing solidly, with AI-related investment remaining an important source of support for activity and corporate spending.
At the same time, several participants expressed concern that the current level of the federal funds rate may not be restrictive. In particular, some clients argued that estimates of R* may now be significantly higher than in the pre-pandemic period, potentially around 1.5% or even above.
Inflation remained the central topic in virtually every discussion. A large number of participants expressed concern that the U.S. economy may remain structurally above the Federal Reserve’s target going forward. The emerging “new normal,” according to several clients, is an equilibrium in which inflation stabilizes closer to 3% than to 2%.
On tariffs, some participants argued that our estimate of the impact on the year-over-year rate of core PCE inflation (approximately 0.4 percentage points) may be somewhat too low. However, the same participants also viewed the Fed staff estimate (roughly 0.8 percentage points) as likely too high. Broadly speaking, there appears to be consensus that tariffs are inflationary, but substantial uncertainty remains regarding the magnitude and persistence of the effect.
Regarding monetary policy, most participants viewed market pricing of more than one Fed hike in 2026 as excessive. Several clients also questioned the political feasibility of rate hikes, given the increasingly tense political environment in the United States. In this context, some participants suggested that if the Fed were to hike, it would most likely do so only after the mid-term elections.
A number of participants also expressed concern about Kevin Warsh’s suggestion that the Federal Reserve could potentially target trimmed-mean inflation measures. We broadly share these concerns, as discussed during meetings.
On the inflation outlook, several clients viewed our CPI forecast as broadly appropriate, though with some upside risks, particularly related to food inflation. Our current projections imply core CPI inflation at 3.0% YoY and headline CPI inflation at 3.9% YoY by December 2026.
Views on our PCE forecast were somewhat more mixed. Some participants argued that our projections for core and headline PCE inflation (3.5% and 3.7% YoY, respectively, by December 2026) may be somewhat too high. We understand the concern. At the same time, even these more dovish participants generally agreed that downside risks are relatively limited and likely amount only to a few tenths.
Several participants also emphasized concerns regarding headline inflation dynamics, particularly the possibility that once inflation moves above 4%, non-linear effects may emerge through expectations, wage-setting behavior, or political reactions. We broadly agree with this concern.
Discussions on fiscal dynamics were similarly intense. A number of participants expressed concern about the long-run trajectory of U.S. public debt and broadly agreed with the conclusions from our model simulations.
Finally, regarding geopolitics, our overall impression was that the majority of participants expect some form of agreement with Iran to eventually emerge, leading to a relatively quick end to the conflict. In such a scenario, some participants expect markets to resume pricing rate cuts for 2026. We would find such an outcome difficult to reconcile with the models, particularly given that inflation is still projected to remain well above target.
Euro Area
On the euro area, there was broad agreement that the region did not face a meaningful inflation problem prior to the Iran-related energy shock.
Most participants also agreed that small deviations from the ECB’s target — for example, core HICP inflation around 2.2% — would likely be tolerated and would not require a monetary policy response from the ECB.
That said, some participants argued that core inflation around 2.5% would likely force the ECB to react. In other words, while moderate overshoots are viewed as manageable, there remains uncertainty regarding the tolerance threshold of the Governing Council.
Regarding our forecasts, some participants viewed our current baseline projections (average 2026 inflation at 2.3% for core HICP and 2.9% for headline HICP) as somewhat too low. However, these same participants also argued that market pricing for inflation in 2027 appears excessively high.
Several clients also expressed the view that the pass-through from energy prices to core inflation may prove stronger in the euro area than currently expected.
Inflation expectations were another recurring topic. Some participants expressed concern about recent increases in short-term inflation expectations. However, many of the same participants also acknowledged that the recent moves are likely driven primarily by gasoline prices and could therefore reverse relatively quickly should the geopolitical situation stabilize.
On ECB pricing, most participants agreed that markets pricing more than three ECB hikes in 2026 appears excessive. These participants generally believed that the risk-reward currently favors fewer hikes, not more.
Some clients also noted that trading the ECB at the moment is particularly difficult because markets are effectively trading the probability distribution of the Iran conflict rather than the ECB reaction function itself.
Views on the labor market were somewhat divided. Some participants expressed concerns about weakening labor market conditions in countries such as Italy and Germany, while others continued to view the euro area labor market as fundamentally healthy. Our own assessment remains somewhat closer to the former view.
Finally, discussions also focused on forward-looking indicators such as PMIs, which many participants described as weak. Some argued that an ECB hike under such conditions would be a policy mistake. Others acknowledged the weak PMIs but argued that the ECB is strongly committed to avoiding a repeat of the 2021 policy error.
Japan
Views on Japan were remarkably consistent across meetings.
Virtually all participants agreed that the Bank of Japan remains behind the curve. Most participants also viewed the inflation process as persistent rather than temporary.
There was broad agreement that the current estimate of underlying inflation (π*) — close to, but still below, 2% — is broadly appropriate.
At the same time, virtually all participants argued that there is no technical justification for maintaining the policy rate at current levels. While views on the neutral rate remain uncertain, most participants ultimately converged around the idea that a neutral rate near 1% may be reasonable.
The weakness of the yen was also viewed as an important complication for the macroeconomic outlook. Several participants argued that addressing the yen’s weakness would likely require a more coordinated and credible fiscal and monetary policy framework than currently exists.
Finally, most participants continue to expect further steepening of the Japanese yield curve.
Switzerland
Discussions on Switzerland were relatively straightforward.
Virtually all participants agreed that market pricing of more than one SNB hike in 2026 appears excessive. Indeed, most participants ultimately expect the SNB not to hike at all.
Several participants also argued that inflation is unlikely to rise materially above 1% this year, a view with which we broadly agree.
At the same time, many participants continue to expect the Swiss franc to remain structurally strong going forward.
United Kingdom
We discussed the United Kingdom only briefly during meetings.
Broadly speaking, several clients admitted that they currently have limited conviction in trading UK macro themes. The main reason cited was the perceived poor quality of the data, combined with concerns that inflation expectations may no longer be firmly anchored.
Nevertheless, most participants appeared to agree that returning inflation sustainably to 2% is likely to remain challenging for the UK economy as well.
Overall Takeaways
Stepping back, the dominant theme across regions was persistent uncertainty around inflation.
In the United States, most participants appear increasingly skeptical that inflation will return cleanly to 2% without either a meaningful slowdown or a material tightening of financial conditions. At the same time, there is also broad recognition that the Federal Reserve faces significant political and institutional constraints.
In the euro area, participants generally remain more relaxed about inflation dynamics than in the United States, though the Iran-related energy shock has clearly increased uncertainty around the outlook.
Japan continues to stand out as the region where clients are most convinced that the central bank is behind the curve.
Overall, market participants appear increasingly willing to discuss scenarios involving structurally higher inflation regimes, higher neutral rates, and greater fiscal dominance than what was commonly assumed before the pandemic.