A Negative Supply Shock is.. a Negative Supply Shock.
The outcomes of the June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting aligned closely with our expectations. The Committee continues to express concern regarding the potential persistence of inflation, as well as signs that economic growth may be decelerating. We interpret the meeting’s results as broadly consistent with the implications of our latest model simulations. In our assessment, the Federal Reserve is unlikely to take decisive policy action until it becomes evident which side of its dual mandate takes precedence. This clarity may not emerge prior to the September FOMC meeting, particularly given the ambiguous signals introduced by ongoing negative supply shocks (tariffs and participation).
In private discussions, we reviewed the latest simulation results from the FRB-US model, which have not yet been formally circulated, as analysis is still ongoing. Preliminary findings suggest that, under current assumptions, the Federal Reserve may need to forgo one of the previously anticipated rate cuts in 2025. We interpret Chair Powell’s remarks today as cautious in tone and broadly consistent with the uncertainty reflected in these model-based projections.
As is customary, we have reviewed the question-and-answer segment. While the session was marked by extensive commentary, we consider only two exchanges to be of substantive relevance—detailed below.
Statement
We see nothing interesting in the new statement.
Q&As
Question: What have you learned about tariffs and the passthrough?
Powell. “I think you have to think of these as still quite early days. And so, I think what we’re seeing now is substantial amounts of tariff revenue being collected on the order of 30 billion a month, which is, you know, substantially higher than before. And the evidence seems to be… […] paid only to a small extent through exporters lowering their price. And companies or retailers -institutions that are upstream from the consumer- are paying most of this for now. [Tariffs] are starting to show up in consumer prices, as you know, in the June report, we expect to see more of that. And we know from surveys that companies feel that they [can] put this through the consumer. But the truth is they may not be able to in many cases. So, I think it’s we’re just going to have to watch and learn empirically how much of this and over what period of time. I think we’ve learned that the process will probably be slower than expected at the beginning, but we never expected it to be fast.”
Comment: We concur with Chair Powell’s assessment in this instance. The re-inflationary process appears to have commenced and is likely to persist over the coming months. However, given current conditions, the Federal Reserve has limited scope for immediate action and must remain in a wait-and-see posture. Our baseline anticipates a sequence of three to four consecutive months of robust month-over-month increases in core PCE inflation. Before seeing the data, it remains infeasible for the Fed to reach a definitive policy decision.
Question: Can you look through goods inflation?
Powell. “We are a bit looking through goods inflation by not raising rates. I think the base case […] is that these are one time price effects. Of course, in the end, this will not turn out to be inflation because we’ll make sure that it’s not. […] You want to do that efficiently, though. And that means if you move too soon, you maybe not getting inflation all the way fixed. And you have to come back. That’s inefficient. If you move too late, you might do unnecessary damage to the labor market. So there won’t be, in the end, a big inflationary problem. What we’re trying to do is accomplish that in a way that is efficient. But in the end, there should be no doubt that we will do what we need to do to keep inflation under control.”
Comment: Two key considerations warrant emphasis. First, Chair Powell is correct in noting that, in theory, tariffs represent a one-off shock to the price level. However, as we have repeatedly underscored, inflation expectations are not static. This dynamic is particularly consequential, as certain model specifications currently suggest that inflation does not converge back to target by 2027—implying an elevated steady-state inflation rate (π*) above 2%. This has critical implications for monetary policy: it would be highly unconventional, if not imprudent, for the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates without clear evidence that inflation expectations are both low and firmly anchored.
Second, based on our current projections, by the time of the September FOMC meeting, policymakers are likely to have observed a series of core PCE inflation prints in the range of 0.3%–0.4% month-over-month (seasonally adjusted)—potentially for June, July, and August. This raises an important question: under such conditions, can—or should—a central bank proceed with rate cuts? Moreover, what would be the implications for the long end of the yield curve if such a policy action were undertaken?