In this note, we update the FRB-US baseline through 2024:Q3. The summary is the following: the model estimates another big positive supply shock from higher productivity. In January 2024, FRB-US sent a clear signal (a large positive supply shock) by revising up substantially the level and slope of potential output (our note here). Back then, the model was out of consensus, but the call turned out to be correct eventually. The new FRB-US dataset contains another important signal: the model has revised up again both the level and the slope of Y*. The difference with January is that the positive supply shock is now estimated mainly through higher productivity (as opposed to higher participation). In part II of this note, we discuss the details. For now, we illustrate the new baseline and the implication for the FF rate. Part II-IV will show the stochastic simulations around the baseline, a set of scenarios (including a Trump2 tariff scenario), and explain what happened to the supply-side of the model.
The new dataset and our assumptions
The Fed Board has posted a new FRB-US dataset (here). The dataset was created on September 30th and therefore, we had to update some variables to reflect the BEA annual revision. On top of this, we included Q3 in-sample by assuming the following: 2.8% QoQ ar for real GDP growth, 4.2% for the unemployment rate (average of the quarter), and 2.0% QoQ ar for core PCE prices. We let the model evolve endogenously from Q4 onwards. Finally, we assume R* at 1.0%.
The new baseline
Strong economy. Figure 1 shows the new baseline. As usual, the blue solid lines show the most recent SEP (September 2024), while the red dashed lines show the model forecast. The overall message is simple and clear: according to the model, the economy is strong with real GDP growth expected above 2% this year and the next (this happens because the model, as we will show in part II, now estimates the slope of Y* well above 2%). The unemployment rate is expected to remain around the current level until the beginning of 2025 before declining gently. Core (PCE) inflation remains above target, with core CPI close to 3% (see here). Putting everything together, the model expects the FF rate at 3.6% in 2025:Q4, 3.3% in 2026:Q4, and 3.3% in 2027:Q4.
Figure 1. SEP forecast (blue solid line) and FRB-US forecast (red dashed line)
Note: Real GDP growth and core inflation are expressed as YoY. Core inflation is core PCE price inflation. The blue lines show the latest SEP. The red dashed lines show the “inconsistent FRB-US” forecast (the current baseline), that is the model-based forecast removing the “add-factors” put by the Fed staff to match the latest SEP, updated as specified in the text.
Figure 2 shows the path of selected financial variables. The model expects the 10y to remain well above 4% in the medium-term, with the real expected return on equity close to 6% (in FRB-US the “real expected return on equity” equals the rate on thirty-year Treasury bonds, minus the average rate of inflation expected to prevail over the coming 30 years, plus an equity premium. The latter varies with the corporate bond premium and also includes an AR(1) error term).
Figure 2 shows the path for the 5y, 10y, 30y yield, and real expected return on equity.
Note: SEP forecast (blue solid line) and FRB-US forecast (red dashed line)
Conclusion
At the time of the September SEP, we were puzzled by the outcome of the FOMC. Ultimately, we continue to think that it was a judgmental call by Powell concerned by labor market weakness. Considering the incoming data since the September FOMC and the new FRB-US dataset, we are even more puzzled now, as the model seems to be more realistic than the September SEP. The other Parts of this note are coming soon.