In this note, we discuss a feature of the new NCBs staff forecast that went under the radar: the level of potential output has been revised down significantly (from 2021 onward), pushing up the output gap and putting upper pressure on the inflation forecast. The December Governing Council meeting was largely as expected, trying to push back against markets and failing to sound sufficiently hawkish. Having said that, the upward revision to the core HICP inflation forecast in 2025 caught our eyes. We show that the upward revision is driven by a large downward revision to the level of potential output (or equivalently, an upward revision of the output gap). We discuss the implications for the forecast going forward, the risks around which are to the downside. Finally, we explain why Lagarde’s answer on unit profts and unit labor costs was completely wrong.
The new forecast
The new forecast for core HICP has been revised down -on net- but it is now marginally higher than our model in 2024 and 2025. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the forecast (average YoY) comparing our “main” model (yellow lines) lines to the ECB/NCBs staff (blue lines). The new NCBs staff forecast is revised down in 2023 and 2024, and revised up in 2025. The new forecast is now above our “main” model in 2024 and 2025. The question is: if the incoming data were weaker than expected by the staff and the economy is slowing down, how come the core forecast got revised up in 2025?
Figure 1. Evolution of core HICP forecast – “main” model vs ECB/NCBs staff forecast
2023
2024
2025
It’s potential
A careful reverse-engineering of the NCBs staff forecast reveals a large downward revision to the level of potential output (and an upward revision of the output gap). Figure 2 shows three panels. The top left panel shows the general government budget balance in history and forecast in the last 2 projection exercises (September 2023, and December 2023). The top right panel shows the evolution of real GDP growth, and the bottom panel shows the structural budget balance. The key is that while real GDP and the budget balance are essentially unrevised in 2021-23, the structural balance shows a sizable downward revision which, for what just said, can only be driven by a revision of the level of potential output. Specifically, it seems that the mechanics are the following: the NCBs staff have assumed a lower level of potential which, for a given level of real GDP, results in a higher/larger output gap. And given a higher/larger output gap, for a given level of the budget balance, the structural balance is estimated worse than before.
(If the reader is confused, here is another way of putting it: the structural balance (that is, the balance net of the cycle) is worse than estimated before because the cyclical position is much better than previously thought. In other words: given the positive output gap, the EA should/could have had a much better fiscal balance, therefore the structural balance is revised down).
Figure 2. ECB/NCBs staff forecast of variables of interest
General government budget balance
Real GDP growth
General government structural balance
Does the revision make sense?
Yes, absolutely. We have been vocal in the last two years stressing that the signals from the labor market (and GDI – see here for GDI-GDP gap in Italy) were stronger than GDP. In this sense, the upward revisions made recently to the level of GDP in 2021 were not surprising and we would not be surprised of additional revisions going forward. We have also been vocal that demand in the EA was stronger than estimated and was contributing to the runup in inflation. Therefore, the upward revision of the output gap (in our view, close to zero in 2021 and positive in 2022 and 2023) alleviates a tension in the Okun law error and helps explaining the demand-driven portion of core inflation.
Implications for core inflation
Upper pressure. The upward revision of the output gap helps explaining the evolution of core inflation in history and put upper pressure in the forecast. Nevertheless, despite the large revision to potential, core HICP is revised up only 1 tenth in 2025, as the output gap revision was offset by the downward surprise of the incoming data. Going forward, unless the staff will revise potential again (unlikely, in our view), the risks around the core HICP inflation forecast are to the downside, as the output gap is unlikely to put more upper pressure than it is right now. From our perspective, we will align the estimate of the output gap to the ECB/NCBs staff, and we will continue using the main model as our guidance.
The Q&A – Review
Question: “If I understood your right, the main driver for the relatively stubborn inflation in the coming months will be wages and profits. Does this mean that there’s still some kind of risk for some kind of wage price spiral or is it something else?”
Lagarde: “It’s something that staff both here at the ECB, but also in the national central bank looks at very carefully. And what we have seen is a contribution from profit unit to inflation declining over the course of 2023. On memories, contribution was 2.4 and is now down to 1.4 percent. If that is confirmed, but it’s a big if and we need to really understand and make sure that this is sustainable, but if that is confirmed, it would mean that the hypotheticals that we had in our previous forecast and that we have for this forecast in December, which was that markups would be reduced in order to absorb increased wages by way of catch up or otherwise.. that is actually taking place which would be really good news for inflation purposes. But we don’t have enough on the table to really determine that this is what is going to happen.”
Comment: It is hard to comment Lagarde’s answer because it is entirely wrong. What Lagarde has in mind is the usual national account identity of the GDP deflator and it contributions (unit labor cost, unit profits, and unit taxes). We have already dedicated two notes to the subject: here, and here. The key point to keep in mind is that the identity is not a casual relation. Indeed, for a constant markup, higher (nominal) unit profits can be simply the consequence of higher marginal costs. The evidence for the Euro area points to constant markups (see here, and here) and higher nominal unit profits driven by higher energy costs. In other words, Lagarde is (i) confusing a national account identity for a causal relation, and (ii) what she says about the markups is not supported by research of NCBs staff members. We invite the reader to take a look at our past notes on this point (again here, and here)