Euro Area: October 2023 Final HICP Distributions and Models Update

A Good Month, Need More

A PDF containing all relevant charts for the EA can be downloaded here. A PDF containing all relevant charts for the big 4 countries can be downloaded here.

Evidence from the distributions

The distribution: good progress. This month, most percentiles moved down (ridge plot here), a very promising signal. Also, in the last 3 months (the black line in Figure 1) the distribution has continued to shift to the left. The median (Figure 2) has dropped notably compared to a year ago and it is now around target. 

Some further progresses are required, as the current readings seem more consistent with a 3% core HICP reading than 2%. But we are going in the right direction with some momentum.

Figure 1. Kernel of HICP excluding food and energy items changes (%, a.r.)

Figure 2.  Median of HICP excluding food and energy items prices increase

Evidence from our CI-C model

Our CI-C model estimates that net of Covid and idiosyncratic shocks, the common component across items in October was in line with  previous months. Figure 3 shows the decomposition of the MoM of core HICP in the “common” component, the “idiosyncratic” component, and the “Covid” effect.  The model estimates that in October the common component increased by 17bps, in line with the average of the previous months. The Covid effect is estimated at 8bps, and the idiosyncratic shock is a small positive (2bps). As we did in previous months, we consider as “true” core the one netting out the idiosyncratic part. Therefore, a rough estimate put the MoM (saar) of “true” core HICP at around 3.0% in October, roughly in line with the previous  months. In this moment, the signals from the distributions, the CI-C model, and the “main” Phillips curve model (see below), they all point to a “true” core HICP inflation around 2.5%-3% (which is the level we can expect the MoM saar to print in the near-term going forward, as we wrote in recent months).

Figure 3. Contributions to MoM changes of HICP excluding food and energy items

Note: the Figure shows the decomposition of the MoM percent changes of HICP prices excluding food and energy items. The contributions are estimated using our CI-C model, a 2-stage OLS-LASSO regression model. The “Covid” effect is identified with price variations outside the 10th-90th percentiles of each item pre-Covid price change distribution.

Figure 4. Estimated “Common” component: YoY, 3m/3m a.r. and 6m/6m a.r.

Note: the Figure shows the 3m/3m at annual rate (green line), the 6m/6m at annual rate (red line), and the YoY (blue line) of the “common component” estimated using our CI-C model.

Implications for the medium-term forecast of core HICP

Medium-term model-based forecast is lower. Today’s data imply only cosmetic revisions to the medium-term model-based forecast, as the final reading for October was in line with the flash estimate. However, we have revised down our Q4 nowcast of core HICP (to 3.2% QoQ saar), and the model is run on revised assumptions for core import prices (now forecasted to growth at an annual rate of -2% going forward) and energy prices (as usual, we remind the reader we can run our models using his/her own conditioning assumptions). Using the unemployment rate as measure of “slack”, the forecast is at 4.3% (Q4/Q4) in 2023 (average of four quarters at 5.0%), 2.8% in 2024, 2.8% in 2025, and 2.8% in 2026. Using the output gap (right panel in Figure 5), the model delivers a more dovish forecast: 4.3% (Q4/Q4) in 2023, 2.5% in 2024, 2.1% in 2025, and 2.1% in 2026. See below for a comparison with the ECB/NCBs staff forecast.

Figure 5. Model-based medium-term forecast of core HICP (YoY)

Using Urate as a measure of “slack”

Using outputp gap as a measure of “slack”

Note: the confidence intervals (C.I.) are calculated using the estimated parameters distributions.

First quarter of forecast: 2024:Q1.

A comparison with the ECB/NCBs staff forecast

Risks around the ECB/NCBs forecasts remain to the upside in 2024. Table 1 shows a comparison between our (updated) forecast and the new ECB/NCBs staff forecast. 2023 acquired inflation for core HICP is 5.0%, and the 2023 carryover for 2024 is 1.5%-1.6%. In other words, Table 1 implies two things. First, reaching target (as average of the YoY) in 2024 can already be ruled out because the carryover from 2023 is too high. Second, despite some downward revisions to the model forecast, the 2024 projection remains above the ECB/NCBs staff. For this reason, we continue to think that it will be very difficult for the NCBs staff to revise down the 2024 core HICP forecast at the December meeting (unless the staff will fold-in a recession in the forecast, which at the moment does not seem the baseline).

(For a technical note on the concepts of “acquired inflation” and “carryover effect” see here and here).

Table 1. Comparison of forecasts

Note: the “UnderlyingInflation” forecast refers to the “main” model in Figure 5 (using the output gap as a measure of “slack”, judgmentally adjusted).

Implications for the ECB

Today’s release does not alter our view. In December, the Governing Council will receive new forecasts from the NCBs. At the moment, we expect these new forecasts to show lower GDP growth but not a recession. From our point of view, the main issue continues to be the same: the 2024 core HICP forecast submitted in September is quite low, given the 2023 carryover for 2024. Therefore, in our estimates, a significant downward revision to 2024 core HICP forecast is not likely. Going beyond 2024, the models suggest that the new NCBs staff forecast can easily converge to 2% at the end of the medium-term. All told, everything seems to suggest that the ECB will remain very cautious and on-hold. We expect communication to stress the progresses achieved and the risks around the forecast with no discussion about a possible cut of the deposit rate.

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