US: September 2023 PCE Distributions and Models Update

Stalling – A Very Worrying Report

Preamble – Updating our FRB-US results, nothing has changed. Yesterday, we have circulated a note (here) using FRB-US model to forecast the path of the FF rate and simulate a term premium shock. In the meanwhile, the BEA has released Q3 GDP figures. For this reason, we have updated the model again. As expected, the new results are nearly identical to those discussed in our note (for the record, the reader can see the updated main results here). To sum up: the reader can still refer to the note circulated yesterday for a full analysis.

A PPT containing all relevant CPI/PCE charts can be downloaded here.

Evidence from the distributions

Stalling. This month, most percentiles moved up (Figure 1), reversing the evidence of the last couple of months. Not only, but the kernel of the last 3 months (Figure 2) shows no signs of progress, an evidence in line with CPI space, see here. The median of the distribution (Figure 3) has also bounced back this month, adding fuel to our concerns. Putting everything together: we are stalling, and unsurprisingly so given the labor market. Not only, but we anticipate moderately higher readings in the next 3 months which can potentially move the distribution marginally to the right.

To sum up: there is still little evidence the Fed can achieve its 2% target; if anything, the evidence points to a persistent 3%-ish environment going forward, net of a recession.

Figure 1. Distribution of PCE excluding food and energy items changes (%, a.r.)

Note: the Figure shows the fitted Kernel (Epanechnikov) distribution of MoM percent changes at annual rate of PCE prices excluding food and energy items. The colors indicate the percentiles: 0-10pct, 10-25pct, etc. The dashed line shows the median of the distribution.

Figure 2. Kernel of PCE excluding food and energy items changes (%, a.r.)

Note: the Figure shows the fitted Kernel (Epanechnikov) distribution of MoM percent changes at annual rate of PCE prices excluding food and energy items.

Figure 3.  Median PCE price increase

Note: the Figure shows the median (MoM %, a.r.) of the distribution of PCE prices changes excluding food and energy items (left panel) and the YoY (right panel).

Evidence from our CI-C model

Our CI-C model estimates a solid “common” component. Figure 4 shows the decomposition of the MoM of core PCE in the “common” component, the “idiosyncratic” component, and the “Covid” effect.  The model estimates that in September the common component increased by 16bps. The Covid effect is solid (12bps), while the idiosyncratic shock is very small (1bp). Overall, the common component is losing steam (Figure 5) but it is still too early to conclude we can go back to 2%, especially because in the next 3 months the common component can bounce back.

Figure 4. Contributions to MoM changes of PCE excluding food and energy items (CI-C model)

Note: the Figure shows the decomposition of the MoM percent changes of PCE prices excluding food and energy items. The contributions are estimated using our CI-C model, a 2-stage OLS-LASSO regression model. The “Covid” effect is identified with price variations outside the 10th-90th percentiles of each item pre-Covid price change distribution.

Figure 5. Estimated “Common” component: YoY, 3m/3m a.r. and 6m/6m a.r.

Note: the Figure shows the 3m/3m at annual rate (green line), the 6m/6m at annual rate (red line), and the YoY (blue line) of the “common component” estimated using our CI-C model.

Implications for the medium-term forecast of core PCE price inflation

The medium-term forecast of core PCE is little changed and unlikely to be revised down significantly this quarter. The “main” model forecast is: 3.5% in 2023, 2.6% in 2024, 2.5% in 2025, and 2.4% in 2026. Compared to the run in our “Pre-FOMC Meeting Package” (here), the forecast is little changed. The model forecast for 2023 continues to be below the SEP, and the YoY of our judgmental bottom-up forecast is now in line with the model at 3.5% in December. For the record, the model expects Q4 at 3.1% (QoQ saar), while our bottom-up forecast is at 3.2%. In other words, the model should not revise down significantly its forecast for at least another 3 months.

Note: the figure shows the latest run of our “main” Phillips curve model. The confidence intervals (C.I.) are estimated using quasi-out-of-sample methods (estimate the model over a sub-sample, forecast, and calculate the root mean squared forecast errors). First quarter of forecast: 2023:Q4.

Implications for the Fed Board staff

Autopilot. Today’s report changes nothing for the Fed. Monetary policy is on autopilot, especially the “for longer” message. Any other discussion is for the December round. (Admittedly, after this report we feel less confident that the Fed will be done hiking – if it was for us, the central bank should go back hiking immediately and scream for help from fiscal. But for the time being, it seems there is no appetite to reach the 2% target any time soon)

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