Euro Area: The ECB Steepener

For brevity, we proceed by bullet points.

  • The ECB raised the deposit rate by 25bps. While this was a close call, ultimately not surprising. In our pre-GC meeting package, we wrote “gun pointed to our head, we would bet on a hike”. The Taylor rules (see slide 19 here), pointed to a terminal rate of at least 4%. For the record: the Taylor rules have been sending this signal for several quarters. For instance, the reader can refer to this April note in which we suggested a terminal rate of (at least) 4%.
  • The intended steepener. In our pre-GC meeting package, we wrote: “More importantly, the Taylor rules continue to signal a “for long(er)” path of the deposit rate, which we expect to be the main message this round.” Overall, we think this was the intention of the ECB communication (steepener), see next bullet.
  • For longer means for longer. In the statement, we read: “Based on its current assessment, the Governing Council considers that the key ECB interest rates have reached levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, will make a substantial contribution to the timely return of inflation to the target.” We interpret the statement as follows: “The Taylor rules suggest that the deposit rate should be brought to a minimum of 4%. Therefore, the current level is the lower-bound of the possible restrictive levels. The Taylor rules also imply that the current level should be maintained for a long period of time. Unless the labor market breaks down or we start having great news on the inflation front, any hope of a cut soon is vain”. (Please note that Lagarde stressed the word “duration” 2-3 times during the press conference)
  • Headline inflation forecast. The ECB staff revised up its headline inflation forecast for 2023 (to 5.6%) and 2024 (to 3.2%), and marginally down in 2025. This is unsurprising because our model was at 5.7% in 2023 and 4.0% in 2024.
  • Core inflation forecast essentially unchanged. In the pre-GC meeting package, we wrote “We expect the ECB staff forecast to be little changed. […] A possible compromise could be to make only cosmetic changes to the forecast this round and wait until December.” Indeed, the ECB staff left the core HICP inflation forecast essentially unchanged. Admittedly, if anything we expected a marginal revision up in 2024 while the staff cut it by 10bps to 2.9%. The reason why the ECB staff ended up with a marginally lower forecast is because they cut growth more than (what we) expected. In any case, the fact that the ECB staff cut growth significantly and left the core HICP forecast essentially unchanged is an implicit admission that the previous forecast was too low, as we have been repeating for months.
  • The overall message is still hawkish: “job is not done”. The main message of the new ECB staff forecast is what we expected. As we wrote in our email “nothing really says that -net of a recession- the ECB can hit 2% by 2025”. Indeed, the new forecast shows core HICP remaining above target in 2025 despite the GDP slowdown and despite the additional tightening. We take it as a victory lap of the models because they have been suggesting a simple message for a long time: recession or monetary policy needs to remain restrictive for long because, net of a recession, the ECB/NCBs staff cannot see core at 2% at the end of the medium-term. (Note: Riccardo writing here based on my experience. While a 10bps revision in 2024 is cosmetic and -in this case- reduces a previous “tension” in the forecast, the level of the forecast at the end of the medium-term is everything. As mentioned, the message of the ECB forecast is “despite everything, we still cannot ensure that core HICP will be at target in 2025”. An anecdote: I remember a Fed staff meeting back in 2018. We had to make a call because our core PCE price inflation forecast at the end of the medium-term was 1.95%: 1.9% or 2.0%? Of course, there is no model that has such forecasting precision 3 years out. But the point is the message sent to the FOMC/GC: 1.9% meant “job not done” back then at the Fed. The same thing applies now: 2.2% for core HICP in 2025 means “job not done”).
  • The new forecast for core HICP continues to have problems. The new forecast of the ECB staff for core HICP is better than the previous one (given that growth is lower) but the 2024 issue is still there. Figure 1 (see below after bullet points) shows the updated forecast of our “main” Phillips curve model conditional on the new assumptions. The left panel shows the model that uses the unemployment rate as a measure of “slack” while the right panel shows its variation using the output gap. Both models are at 5.3% in 2023 (average YoY). In 2024, the model using the output gap is at 4.1%, while the one using the Urate is at 4.0%. As for 2025, the models are at 2.9% and 3.2%, respectively. Put it differently: the risks are still to the upside around the ECB staff forecast. The intuition for the 2024 forecast is always the same: slowdown or not, the carryover effect is (too) high and the forecast in the model remains above the ECB staff, unless we assume a (non-mild) recession. (for the record: we are very glad that during the press conference Lagarde mentioned the “carryover” effect in the context of GDP growth)
  • Can the ECB staff forecast be right? Sure, as usual it can be. But in order to be so, the level of core HICP in 2023 should essentially stop growing now (acquired inflation in 2023 is 4.9%-5.0%). Or we can have a recession. Otherwise, the risks remain to the upside.

Figure 1. Updated “main” model forecast, core HICP (YoY)

Using unemployment rate as a measure of “slack”

Using output gap as a measure of “slack”

Conclusion and implications for monetary policy

We expect the long-end of the curve to remain under stress. The path for lower rates comes from lower growth. Projections in December can easily remain unfavorable. Our updated baseline is not materially different than before the Governing Council. The ECB staff forecast continues to have issues: conditional on no recession, in our estimates core HICP in 2024 can easily be higher than the ECB/NCBs staff is projecting. We think that the “for longer” message of the ECB is credible and markets should listen (or learn it the hard way again as they did with the US..). The probability of another hike is pretty low, although it is non-zero and probably higher than markets are pricing. As for the December projection, we are really not sure the forecast for core HICP can converge to 2% at the end of the medium-term. Translated: unless the labor market will break (or we will have downward surprises on core HICP), or we expect monetary policy to remain hawkish. Putting everything together, in this baseline we expect the long-end of the curve to remain under stress. As we have mentioned recently, the path for lower rates in our view and estimates comes from lower growth (a recession), not really from lower inflation because, as mentioned, it continues to be hard to project core at target.

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