The Models Have Spoken
A lot of progress, expect more. The data received today are a bit softer than expected at the time of the July FOMC as previous months got revised down a touch. According to our models, June was another month of good news in core PCE space: (i) the distribution shows additional signs of disinflation, (ii) the median of core PCE price changes ticked down again and it is at pre-Covid levels, (iii) the common component of our CI-C model is trending down. Not only, but the shape (and the percentiles) of the distribution are now pretty similar to pre-Covid (see Figure 1 and 2 below). Admittedly, this has happened faster than what we expected and it is a very important development. As for the medium-term model-based forecast, a stronger GDP growth (lower unemployment rate path) was offset by a lower starting point in core PCE space. The net effect of the two is close to zero and the forecast is little changed compared to the time of the July FOMC. Having said that, if the good news will continue (as we expect), the models can provide ground to the FOMC to stop hiking and possibly revise down the dots.
Evidence from the distributions
Regaining the mean. This month, all percentiles excluding p10 moved down (Figure 1). The kernel of the last 3 months (Figure 2) continues to travel to the left and gain mass around the pre-Covid mean. Importantly, the distribution is now looking very similar to pre-Covid. Finally, the median of the distribution (Figure 3) has dropped recently and remains to a level in line with those recorded pre-Covid. Translated: unless we have large shocks going forward, in the near-term we continue to expect moderate readings.
Figure 1. Distribution of PCE excluding food and energy items changes (%, a.r.)
Note: the Figure shows the fitted Kernel (Epanechnikov) distribution of MoM percent changes at annual rate of PCE prices excluding food and energy items. The colors indicate the percentiles: 0-10pct, 10-25pct, etc. The dashed line shows the median of the distribution.
Figure 2. Kernel of PCE excluding food and energy items changes (%, a.r.)
Note: the Figure shows the fitted Kernel (Epanechnikov) distribution of MoM percent changes at annual rate of PCE prices excluding food and energy items.
Figure 3. Median PCE price increase
Note: the Figure shows the median (MoM %, a.r.) of the distribution of PCE prices changes excluding food and energy items (left panel) and the YoY (right panel).
Evidence from our CI-C model
Our CI-C model estimates that net of Covid and idiosyncratic shocks, the strength of the data is losing steam. Figure 4 shows the decomposition of the MoM of core PCE in the “common” component, the “idiosyncratic” component, and the “Covid” effect. The model estimates that in June the common component increased by 15bps. The Covid effect is estimated at 3bps, and the idiosyncratic shock is small negative (-2bps). Overall, the common component is losing steam (Figure 5).
(Note: admittedly, June was a “lucky” month, as the idiosyncratic component fell. Still, we are not giving much weight because the size of the contraction is very small)
Figure 4. Contributions to MoM changes of PCE excluding food and energy items (CI-C model)
Note: the Figure shows the decomposition of the MoM percent changes of PCE prices excluding food and energy items. The contributions are estimated using our CI-C model, a 2-stage OLS-LASSO regression model. The “Covid” effect is identified with price variations outside the 10th-90th percentiles of each item pre-Covid price change distribution.
Figure 5. Estimated “Common” component: YoY, 3m/3m a.r. and 6m/6m a.r.
Note: the Figure shows the 3m/3m at annual rate (green line), the 6m/6m at annual rate (red line), and the YoY (blue line) of the “common component” estimated using our CI-C model.
Implications for the medium-term forecast of core PCE price inflation
The medium-term forecast of core PCE is little changed. Since the July FOMC we got positive news in terms of growth but the starting point of the model has been revised down. The net effect of the two is close to zero. The “main” model forecast is: 3.7% in 2023, 3.0% in 2024, and 2.7% in 2025. The model forecast for 2023 continues to be below the June SEP (and it is in line with our judgmental bottom up forecast, which currently stands at 3.6%-3.7% in December 2023).
Note: the figure shows the latest run of our “main” Phillips curve model. The confidence intervals (C.I.) are estimated using quasi-out-of-sample methods (estimate the model over a sub-sample, forecast, and calculate the root mean squared forecast errors). First quarter of forecast: 2023:Q4.
Implications for the Fed Board staff
We only care about what the data and the models say. And the models have spoken. We defer the discussion about the slope of the Phillips curve to another note. The message for today is pretty simple: disinflation is coming fast and faster than the FOMC is expecting. Even considering some rebound in Q4, it is possible that the models will be surprised down in H2 and we would not be surprised to see the FOMC to revising down their forecast in September (and possibly the FF dots, if not in September then in December).