Preamble: about today’s AHE figure, please note that January 2023 had 9 weekend days (Sat-Sun), while February had 8 of them. Therefore, the so-called “residual calendarity” effect (see here for a note in which we explain the technical details) is estimated as a negative drag (6-7bps) on the MoM in February. An experimental model, which controls for employment shares across sectors and residual calendarity, put the AHE growth rate around 4% at annual rate with little signs of deceleration. Therefore, we invite to take today’s AHE figure with caution. In our view, today’s numbers do not change the story for this round.
(Needless to say, we are working under the assumption that the current SVB-related turmoil will not trigger a major contagion)
In our view and estimates, the March 2023 FOMC round will be a very tough round for the Fed staff. The incoming data have been stronger than expected by the Fed staff (as inferred from the last FOMC minutes) and in our estimates will force the staff to revise up both its near-term and medium-term forecast, therefore entirely reversing the bad call of the January meeting. Not only but, once again, there is now a large discrepancy between the staff judgmental forecast (the one reported in the Tealbook) and model-based forecasts (which have clearly outperformed the judgmental forecast for about 2 years.. see Figure 0 here for the evolution of our “main” model forecast compared to the Fed staff and SEP). Translated: in our estimates, the data will force the staff to do the right thing (revise up the judgmental forecast) but the gap with the models is so large that is becoming progressively challenging for the staff to “keep the forecast together” and justify it.
As for the FF rate, our analysis suggests a terminal rate of 5.6%, with a higher path in 2024 and 2025 compared to previous rounds.
Main points:
- Incoming data stronger than expected. The incoming data on core PCE price inflation have been stronger than the Fed staff forecast inferred from the latest FOMC minutes. The upward surprise is significant this round and should lead the staff to revise up both its near-term and medium-term forecast.
- Risks around the Fed staff forecast are skewed to the upside. The medium-term model-based forecast of core PCE price inflation (left panel in the figure below) is higher than at the time of the January FOMC as the incoming data were stronger then expected and the model revised up the estimated persistency of inflation (see here for details). When assessing the model uncertainty (thick modelling approach, right panel below), it is clear that alternative specifications convey the same message and the forecasts are well above the Fed staff forecast of the January FOMC (the green dots).
Thick modelling approach.
Note: The figure shows the distribution of point forecasts of core PCE price inflation of a large set of models (around 50,000 in total), each differing by one assumption (i.e. different type of slack, different number of lags of the endogenous variable, etc..). The green dots show the latest Fed staff forecast of core PCE price inflation as inferred from the FOMC minutes.
- We expect the Fed staff to revise up its judgmental forecast in each year. After revising it down in January, we expect the staff to reverse the call entirely and revise up its medium-term judgmental forecast (the Tealbook, figure below shows what we expect and its contributions) this round, forced by the incoming data. We expect an upward revision of 4-5 tenths in 2023 and 1-2 tenths in 2025. In our view, the Fed staff has attributed most of the strength of the 2021-2022 data to the «other factors», that is to factors that are unrelated to the fundamentals (underlying inflation, slack, relative import prices, and relative energy prices). As for 2023, in our estimates the calibrated fundamentals of the Fed staff currently suggest a 2¾%-ish reading. Therefore, in our estimates the staff ends up with a big residual (yellow bar) in 2023 which gives a large discretionary margin (of error) to set the forecast. All told, despite the possible upward revisions, in our view the profile of the Fed staff forecast remains very optimistic and too judgmental, given the estimated persistency of the process.
- Conditional on the new forecasts, the Fed staff (2021) Taylor rule and the inertial Taylor (1999) rule imply a terminal FF rate of 5.6%, 3 tenths higher than in December/January. The main message of the Taylor rule exercise is that under several simulations, it is hard to get a higher terminal rate (higher than 5.6%). This happens because the main difference with the January round is the trajectory of inflation (not its peak), which is more persistent and pushes up the FF rate trajectory in 2024 and 2025.
As usual, we would be more than happy to schedule a meeting to discuss the details. We will circulate an updated package after next week CPI report.